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CRIMINAL LAW
RESTITUTION, CRIMINAL LAW, AND
THE IDEOLOGY OF INDIVIDUALITY*
RICHARD C. BOLDT**
INTRODUCTION
In the past fifteen years, a flurry of academic, judicial and legis-
lative interest has been directed toward proposals advocating an in-
creased use of restitution in the criminal process.' Although some
* Many friends and colleagues have read earlier drafts of this article. In particular,
Stacy Burns, Joseph Goldstein, Phyllis Goldfarb, Seth Lieberman, Daniel Reynolds,
Daniel Schneider, Garth Seiple, Leonard Strickman, Kendall Thomas, and Jean Zorn
have provided invaluable assistance and encouragement.
** Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, City University of New York Law School at
Queens College; Assistant Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of
Law. J.D., Yale Law School, 1982; A.B., Columbia College, 1979.
1 See generally ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTrIUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL
PROCESS (1977); REsTrrtrION IN CRIMINALJUSTICE (1977); Harland, Monetary Remediesfor
the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 52 (1982).
A number of state legislatures have adopted provisions allowing for the use of resti-
tution as a condition of probation. ALA. CODE § 15-22-52(8) (1977); ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.100(a)(2) (1985); Amx. STAT. ANN. § 41-1203(2)(h) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.1 (West Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a)(4) (West 1985); GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-2711 (1982); HAw. REV. STAT. § 706-624(2)(i) (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-38-22(a)(5) (West Supp. 1985); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 533-030.(3)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 895(A)(7) (West 1984);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1204(2)(B) (1983); MD. CraM. LAW CODE ANN. art 27
§ 641(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1985); MICH. COMP. Laws ANN. § 771.3 (West Supp. 1986);
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-2219(2)(), 29-2262(2)q) (1979); NEv. REV. STAT. § 176.185(3)
(1981); NJ. REV. STAT. § 2C:45-1(b)(8) (1982 & West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-20-6 (1985); N.Y. PENAL Lw § 65.10(2)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1343(d) (1983); N.D. CENr. CODE § 12.1-32-07 (1976). OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2951.01(c) (Anderson 1982 & Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 991a(1)(A) (West Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.106 (1984); 18 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 1106 (1983); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 42.12, § 6c (Vernon 1978 & Supp.
1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 252 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §§ 19.2-305, 19.2-305.1
(Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.210 (2) (West Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE
§ 62-12-9 (1984).
In addition, some state legislatures have authorized the use of restitution in connec-
tion with suspended sentences, conditional discharges, fines and incarceration. See Har-
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scholarly attention has been given to the question of whether resti-
tution2 should be used as a criminal sentence, 3 the great bulk of
writing in this area has been concerned with particular problems of
implementation, 4 including issues of notice, proof, and en-
forcement.
5
One of the most vexatious of these problems has involved the
question of what relationship, if any, an order of restitution should
hold to the "offense of conviction," 6 the specific offense (or of-
fenses) of which an offender has been convicted. 7 Some courts have
held that an offender's restitutionary liability must be limited to in-
juries directly caused by the offense of conviction.8 A strong con-
land, supra, at 71-72. Other states have enacted legislation requiring courts to impose
restitutionary sanctions for particular categories of offenses or harms. Id.
2 Strictly speaking, the terms "restitution," "reparation," and "compensation" are
neither interchangeable nor overlapping. As used in the literature, restitution and repa-
ration refer to remedies which draw wholly upon the resources of the offender. Com-
pensation, on the other hand, refers to a making whole of the victim by the state.
Restitution differs from reparation in that it contemplates a restoration in kind rather
than by way of some monetary equivalent. See generally S. SCHAFER, COMPENSATION AND
REsTrrtrrIoN TO VICTIMS OF CRIME x-xi (2d ed. 1970); Harland, Theoretical and Program-
matic Concerns in Resitution: An Integration, in OFFENDER REsTTrrUION IN THEORY AND Ac-
TION 193, 194-95 (1978).
In the discussion that follows, the term restitution will be employed to refer to all
restorative activity undertaken by an offender. In this regard, the term should be read to
include the return of property by an offender to his or her victim; the payment of money
by an offender to his or her victim; the provision of service by an offender to his or her
victim; or the provision of service by an offender to a third party.
3 See, e.g., S. SCHAFER, supra note 2; Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal
Justice, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
349 (1977); Epstein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL:
RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 231 (1977); Klein, Revitalizing Resti-
tution: Flogging a Horse that May Have Been Killed for Just Cause, 20 CRIM. L.Q. 383 (1978).
4 Harland, supra note 1, at 119-20.
5 Edlehertz, Legal and Operational Issues in the Implementation of Restitution Within the
CriminalJustice System, in RESTrUTION IN CRIMINALJUSTICE 63 (1977); Note, Victim Restitu-
tion in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HARv. L. REV. 931 (1984) [hereinafter
Note, Victim Restitution]; Note, Restitution in the Criminal Process: Procedures for Fixing the
Offender's Liability, 93 YALE LJ. 505 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Restititution in the Criminal
Process].
6 See generally Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss.
LJ. 515, 536-42 (1982); Harland, supra note 1, at 81-86; Note, Restitution in the Criminal
Process, supra note 5, at 511-16.
7 Note, Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note 5, at 507.
8 E.g., Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1977)(order of restitution requiring
payment in excess of amount of damage criminal conduct caused victim held improper);
People v. Becker, 349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957)(restitution order for damages
caused by an automobile accident held improper because conviction was for unlawfully
leaving the scene of a personal injury accident); State v. Elits, 94 Wash. 2d 489, 617 P.2d
993 (1980)(restitution order in which defendant required to pay 87 separate defrauded
investors held invalid because conviction included only seven counts of fraud and two
counts of selling unregistered securities).
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trary tendency, however, has been to allow restitution orders to
stand, even though they are well beyond the technical scope of any
offense of which the offender has been found guilty.9
Orders of restitution generally are employed in the criminal
process as a condition of probation.' 0 Consequently, in addressing
"offense of conviction" problems, courts frequently have been
forced to construe ambiguous statutes which authorize the use of
probation as a criminal disposition." The rules generated by this
9 E.g., People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 541 P.2d 545, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1975)(resti-
tution as to acquitted charge upheld); People v. Seda-Ruiz, 87 Mich. App. 100, 273
N.W.2d 602, 603-04 (1978) (restitution order upheld where offender had been convicted
of passing three checks of nonsufficient funds even though he had been ordered to pay
restitution for "many other checks"); People v. Gallagher, 55 Mich. App. 613, 223
N.W.2d 92 (1974)(restitution order requiring offender to repay cost of stolen automo-
bile upheld even though he had been convicted of receiving only the automobile's cowl);
State v. Rogers, 30 Wash. App. 653, 638 P.2d 89 (198 1)(defendant who was convicted of
possessing stolen property of a value less than $1500 ordered to pay restitution in ex-
cess of that amount).
An order to pay restitution may be said to exceed the offense of conviction-the
offense or offenses of which the offender has been convicted, either by way of trial or
guilty plea-in a number of ways. First, the ordered repayment may be for injuries
caused by conduct of the offender which is related to, but not the same as, that which is a
material element of the offense of conviction. See, e.g., DiOrio v. State, 359 So. 2d 45
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(defendant convicted of unlawfully leaving the scene of an au-
tomobile accident which resulted in injury ordered to pay restitution for damages
caused by accident). Alternatively, in cases where an offender had engaged in a course
of conduct comprised of a series of similar acts but has been convicted of only a portion
of those acts, a restitution order based upon the entire course of conduct would be
beyond the scope of the offense of conviction. E.g., State v. Elits, 94 Wash. 2d 489, 617
P.2d 993 (1980). This situation may arise if the additional acts which constitute addi-
tional counts or additional offenses have not been prosecuted, cf. State v. Scheer, 9 Wis.
2d 418, 101 N.W.2d 77 (1960)(recognizing the "common practice in Wisconsin" of
prosecutor charging a defendant with the commission of "only one offense of a series"),
have been dismissed, or have been adjudicated in favor of the defendant, see, e.g., People
v. Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 552 P.2d 97, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1976)(restitution as to
acquitted charge improper); People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 541 P.2d 545, 124 Cal. Rptr.
905 (1975). Finally, an offense of conviction problem may present itself in cases in
which an offender is ordered to pay restitution in an amount greater than the extent of
damage proven at trial or admitted to in the course of pleading guilty. E.g., State v.
Rogers, 30 Wash. App. 653, 638 P.2d 89 (1981).
10 Goldstein, supra note 6, at 536; Harland, supra note 1, at 69. This fact had made it
particularly difficult for offenders to challenge successfully orders of restitution beyond
the scope of an offense of conviction because appellate courts generally have recognized
broad trial court discretion in fashioning conditions of probation, id. at 73, and because
the courts sometimes describe probation as a privilege rather than a right. See, e.g., Peo-
ple v. Good, 287 Mich 110, 282 N.W. 920 (1938). "This defendant was not deprived of
any of his rights without due process; rather he was given the additional privilege of
avoiding the usual penalty of his crime by the payment of a sum of money and the obser-
vance of the other conditions attached to his probation." Id. at 115, 282 N.W. at 923.
11 Although statutory language authorizing the use of restitution as a condition of
probation varies considerably from state to state, Harland, supra note 1, at 81, it is possi-
ble to distinguish states with legislation tending toward an offense of conviction limita-
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interplay of legislation and case law have varied greatly from juris-
diction to jurisdiction and, in a number of instances, from case to
case within a given state or judicial district.'
2
tion, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03 (1)(g) (West 1975) (restitution may be ordered as a
probation condition "to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by lthe of-
fender's] offense.. ."), from states with legislation tending away from such a restriction,
e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 973.09(lm)(a) (West Supp. 1983)(authorizing sentencing courts
to impose any condition which is "reasonable and appropriate").
For years, the Federal Probation Act contained an offense of conviction limitation
which provided that restitution was authorized only for the "offense for which convic-
tion was had." 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976). Numerous federal courts have read this federal
statute as strictly limiting restitutionary orders to injuries clearly within the scope of an
offense of conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1008 (3d Cir.
1977)(defendant convicted of embezzling $262 could not be ordered to pay restitution
of $1,989); Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 986-867 (9th Cir. 1950)(defendant
convicted of six of seventeen counts of fraud could not be ordered to pay restitution to
victims of all seventeen counts); United States v. Follette, 32 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa.
1940) (defendant convicted of embezzling $203 could not be ordered to pay restitution
of $466). In 1982, Congress passed the Victim and Witness Protection Act, which pro-
vides, inter alia for the imposition of restitution as a sanction for federal offenses when-
ever possible. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1982). This new federal provision contains no
offense of conviction limitation, and one commentator has suggested that, in practice,
the restriction in the old probation statute will no longer be operative. Note, Restitution
in the Criminal Process, supra note 5, at 505-09.
12 Compare Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1977) and People v. Becker, 349
Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957) and State v. Elits, 94 Wash. 2d 489, 617 P.2d 993
(1980) with People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 541 P.2d 545, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1975) and
People v. Seda-Ruiz, 87 Mich. App. 100, 273 N.W.2d 602 (1978) and People v. Gal-
lagher, 55 Mich. App. 613, 223 N.W.2d 92 (1974) and State v. Rogers, 30 Wash. App.
653, 638 P.2d 89 (1981).
A good example of doctrinal inconsistency within a single state is suggested by the
offense of conviction case law generated by Florida's state courts. In the only Florida
Supreme Court opinion to consider the offense of conviction issue, the court held that
"a condition of probation requiring a probationer to pay money to, and for the benefit
of, the victim of his [or her] crime cannot require payment in excess of the amount of
damage the criminal conduct caused the victim." Fresneda, 347 So. 2d at 1022. Despite
the relative clarity of this holding, other appellate courts in Florida subsequently have
developed a variety of rationales for upholding restitution orders which encompass inju-
ries far beyond the scope of the offense of conviction. A court in the Second Judical
District of Florida, for example, upheld a restitution condition of probation which went
far beyond the offender's formal conviction, because the offender had agreed to pay the
amount as part of a negotiated guilty plea. In finding the order proper, the appellate
court reasoned that the offender's plea constituted a voluntary and knowing "waiver" of
the "protections" of the probation statute found by the Fresneda court to prohibit expan-
sive restitutionary sentences. Pollock v. Bryson, 450 So. 2d 1183, 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984). In another case, a restitution order beyond the offense of conviction was
upheld on the ground that the injury to be repaid had occurred during the offender's
commission of the offense of which he had been adjudicated guilty. Fresneda was distin-
guished because there the crime of conviction had taken place after the damages which
formed the basis for the restitution order had occurred. J.S.H. v. State, 455 So. 2d 1143,
1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Finally, courts in Florida's Fifth Judicial District have
allowed restitution orders beyond the scope of an offense of conviction on the basis of a
proximate cause standard and on the basis of a vague reasonableness standard. In one
case, the offender had been convicted of a battery yet had been ordered to pay restitu-
[Vol. 77972
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This doctrinal irregularity has been exacerbated by the posture
in which these cases have been presented. In each instance, the
court was asked to reconcile the description of the offender's guilt
generated by the adjudicatory process with an alternative descrip-
tion of the offender's guilt, termed the offender's "actual" offense. 13
The resulting gap between the offender's offense of conviction and
his or her actual offense has been said to result from two sources.' 4
First, the wrongdoing described by the offense of conviction often is
less extensive than the offender's actual guilt because procedural
and evidentiary impediments may restrain the scope of the adjudica-
tory process.15 Second, a gap may exist due to the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion not to charge certain counts or offenses or
to accept a plea to a lesser charge as part of a negotiated guilty
plea.16
Courts presented with an offense of conviction problem, there-
fore, are faced with what appears to be a Hobson's choice. On the
one hand, it seems clear that victims fare better when their recov-
tion for damages to a motor vehicle. The court, in upholding the restitution order,
maintained that the Fresneda offense of conviction limitation did not apply. M.A.R. v.
State, 433 So. 2d 29, 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). In another case, where an offender
had entered guilty pleas to four out of twenty counts of forgery, uttering a forgery, and
fraud, the court, without even a passing reference to Fresneda, upheld a restitution order
for all twenty counts. Rose v. State, 434 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
It is significant to note that the Fresneda court, like the Michigan Supreme Court in
People v. Becker, 349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957), held that restitution may be
ordered for any injury "caused" by the offense of conviction. Id. at 486, 838. While it
seems plain that the causation analysis implied by Becker and Fresneda was meant as a tool
for determining what losses, if any, are within the scope of the offense of conviction,
more recent decisions have employed a causation analysis in order to uphold restitution-
ary obligations reaching far beyond the offense of which the offender had been adjudi-
cated guilty. E.g., M.A.R. v. State, 433 So. 2d 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); People v.
Pettit, 88 Mich. App. 203, 276 N.W.2d 878 (1979). It is one thing to conclude that
restitution may be ordered for an injury which directly resulted from the conduct which
forms part of the offense of conviction. It is quite another to conclude that restitution
may be required for any injury which is in any way causally connected to the conduct for
which a conviction has been had. Id. at 207-09, 881. In recognition of this distinction,
some courts in other states have examined the material elements of the offense of con-
viction in order to determine whether a particular injury is within the scope of the of-
fense of conviction. E.g., State v. Hartwell, 38 Wash. App. 135, 684 P.2d 778, 780
(1984)(restitution order found improper because the victim's injuries were not caused
by "the precise event that is the basis for the charge" (quoting State v. Bedker, 35 Wash.
App. 490, 493, 667 P.2d 1113 (1983))).
13 Cf. Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, 72J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1550 (1981)(discussing and criticizing "real offense sentencing,"
whereby an offender is sanctioned according to his or her actual actions rather than
according to that of which he or she was found guilty).
14 Note, Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note 5, at 510.
15 Id.
16 Id., at 510-11. See also Goldstein, supra note 6, at 537-38.
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eries are not restricted by an offense of conviction limitation. 17 On
the other hand, an order of restitution which goes beyond adjudi-
cated guilt may render the adjudicatory process an empty formality
which plays little or no role in delimiting consequent sanctions. 18
Professor Goldstein has suggested that the resolution of this prob-
lem in any particular case should depend on the court's understand-
ing of the purpose that restitution is thought to serve.1 9 According
to Goldstein, if the court believes that restitution is an "equitable
remedy" meant to serve victims' interests, the court should allow
restitution beyond the scope of the offense of conviction.20 If, on
the other hand, the court understands restitution as a "punishment"
meant to serve the goals of rehabilitation, deterrence or retribution,
the extent of restitution should be limited to the offense of which
the defendant has been convicted. 21
Other writers have addressed this question of purpose more
systematically, and have made some tentative, albeit unsatisfying,
suggestions for the use of restitution as a criminal sanction. One
group has put forward a "restitutionary theory ofjustice." This ap-
proach focuses upon the victim's right to recover his or her losses as
the principal factor in determining criminal liability. 22 This theory
draws upon historical data, suggesting that tribal cultures and other
pre-feudal peoples made no distinction between criminal sanctions
and civil remedies, to support the view that criminal activity pro-
duces a predominantly private harm. 23 The community's interest in
the criminal law typically is de-emphasized, 24 and the notion that
society alone suffers as a consequence of criminal activity is attacked
as "fiction." 25 The traditional distinction between criminal and civil
17 Note, Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note 5, at 510-11.
18 Cf. People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 486-87, 541 P.2d 545, 548, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905,
908 (1975)(discussing defendant's argument that "consideration anew of charges of
which he has been acquitted reduces the jury verdict 'to a sham' ").
19 Goldstein, supra note 6, at 536.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See Barnett & Hagel, Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution, and the Legal Pro-
cess, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 1
(1977). "Restitution recognizes rights in the victim, and this is a principle source of its
strength. The nature and limit of the victim's right to restitution at the same time de-
fines the nature and limit of the criminal liability." Barnett, supra note 3, at 367.
23 Barnett, supra note 3, at 367.
24 Barnett & Hagel, supra note 22, at 10.
25 Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice System: Time for a Change, 11 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 23, 34 (Supp. 1984). See also Silving, Compensation For Victims of Criminal
Violence-A Roundtable, 8J. PUB. L. 236, 252 (1959)(arguing that the "corporate veil" of
expressions such as "community" and "public interest" must be pierced).
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law characteristic of Western jurisprudential thinking 26 routinely is
dismissed as an artificial construct developed in Western Europe
during the High Middle Ages. 27 In these terms, the use of restitu-
tion is said to be justified because it redirects the system's attention
to the true party in interest-the individual victim 28-and, in the
process, serves to ameliorate an excessively rigid dichotomy be-
tween criminal and civil law.29 Specifically, this theory of restitution,
by stressing the central role of the victim and the reparative function
of law, allows the conclusion that restitution should be fixed accord-
ing to the actual injury which an offender has caused.30
A second theory of restitution focuses on the penal and/or re-
habilitative potential of the practice. 3' Here again, the overlapping
objectives of criminal and civil law are stressed, and the traditional
distinction between the two spheres is criticized.3 2 Advocates of this
approach have, nevertheless, based their support for the use of res-
titution on the ground that it furthers the existing objectives of the
criminal justice system.33 They argue that employing restitution as
26 Perhaps the classic treatment of the crime-tort issue is Jerome Hall's two-part arti-
cle in the Columbia Law Review. In the first part of this article, Hall traces the crime-
tort dichotomy to Lord Mansfield's famous statement that "there is no distinction better
known than the distinction between civil and criminal law." Atcheson v. Everitt, I Cowp.
391 (1775). Hall next discusses Blackstone's view that criminal law and tort law are
separate legal categories because the former involves harm to the "whole community,"
while the latter involves injuries which are "immaterial to the public." Hall, Interrelations
of Criminal Law and Torts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 757, (1943)(quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES #2; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES #5). Interestingly, Hall also dis-
cusses the views of Bentham and Austin, two early supporters of criminal restitution,
who both rejected the traditional crime-tort dichotomy, although for somewhat different
reasons. Id. at 758-60.
27 S. SCHAFER, supra note 2, at 3-12; Jacob, Reparation or Restitution by the Criminal Of-
fender to His Victim: Applicability of an Ancient Concept in Modern Correctional Process, 61 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 152, 154 (1970).
28 Barnett, supra note 3, at 367.
29 Goldstein, supra note 6, at 531.
30 Barnett, supra note 3, at 379-80. See also Hofrichter, Techniques of Victim Involvement
in Restitution, in VICTIMS OFFENDERS AND ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS 103 (1980)(asserting
that different justifications for the use of restitution produce different levels of recovery
for victims).
31 Galaway, Restitution as an Integrative Punishment, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTI-
TUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 331 (1977); S. SCHAFER, supra note 2, at
123-29.
32 S. SCHAFER, supra note 2, at 119, 122
The assertion that restitution is inapporpriate as a criminal sentence is uncon-
vincing because it relies on too rigid a dichotomy between criminal and civil law.
The characteristics and underlying objectives of these two systems are not markedly
distinct; on the contrary, they overlap to a significant extent ....
Note, Victim Restitution, supra note 5, at 935-36.
33 E.g., Casson, Restitution: An Economically and Socially Desirable Approach to Sentencing, 9
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 349, 353-54 (1983) (restitution can further interests of deter-
rence); Keve, Therapeutic Uses of Restitution, in OFFENDER RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND
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a criminal sanction assists the offender in understanding the conse-
quences of his or her act,3 4 affords him or her the opportunity to
engage in "constructive self-expression,- 3 5 and stimulates his or her
reintegration into the community. 36 In addition, general deter-
rence37 is said to be served and retribution exacted38 through the
use of penal restitution. Because the practice is justified as further-
ing the community's interest in crime control and offender rehabili-
tation, 39 advocates of this approach do not insist that the amount of
ACTION 59, 60-64 (1978)(restitution can assist in rehabilitating offender); McAnany, Res-
titution as Idea and Practice: The Retributive Prospect, in OFFENDER REsTrrTuiON IN THEORY
AND ACTION 15, 24-27 (1978) (restitution may serve as a means of exacting retribution).
Stephen Schafer, a writer who has made a considerable contribution to the restitu-
tion literature, has proposed that restitution be used as a form of punishment rather
than as an alternative to punishment. He has suggested that the practice provides a
mechanism for integrating the multiple purposes of criminal sanctioning, which he iden-
tifies as: specific retribution, which is the expression of an individual victim's feelings of
vengeance; general retribution, which is the expression of the community's sense of
moral and legal order; and rehabilitation, which involves reform of the offender. S.
SCHAFER, supra note 2, at 119-22.
Schafer's reading of the historical and anthropological data, although similar to that
reported by advocates of the "restitutionary theory ofjustice," differs in that he under-
stands the ancient practice of restitution to have involved an element of punishment. See
infra note 70. He reaches this conclusion by arguing that when the payment of restitu-
tion approach was employed, it provided the victim not only with material compensation
but also with an opportunity to express vengeance. S. SCHAFER, supra note 2, at 120. As
the state gradually took over for the victim, see infra text accompanying notes 71-84,
Schafer argues, general retribution absorbed specific retribution, even though the pun-
ishment imposed by the state was intended to offer the victim "spiritual retribution." S.
SCHAFER, supra note 2, at 120. The replacement of material restitution for spiritual resti-
tution in modern criminal law is justified, therefore, because it would re-establish the
nexus between an individual victim's injury and the community's injury. Id. at 122.
34 Dragger, Restitution, Punishment and Debts to Society, in VICTIMS, OFFENDERS, AND AL-
TERNATIVE SANCTIONS 11 (1980). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-603C, 13-702(t)
(West Supp. 1984); Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 798, 266 N.W.2d 403, 407
(1978) (use of restitution as a condition of probation may teach offender to consider the
consequences of his or her conduct).
35 Eglash, Creative Restitution: Some Suggestions for Prison Rehabilitation Programs, 20 AM.
J. CORRECTIONS 20, 21 (1958).
36 Id. at 21-22. See also COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 17-28-101(2), 16-11-204.5 (1977 &
Supp. 1985).
37 Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional Aim Modernized, 50 MINN.
L. REV. 243, 252 (1965); Title, Restitution and Deterrence: An Evaluation of Compatibility, in
OFFENDER RESTrrTION IN THEORY AND ACTION 17 (1978); Note, Victim Restitution, supra
note 5, at 938-39.
38 Note, Victim Restitution, supra note 5 at 939. See also McAnany, supra note 33 (sug-
gesting a partial fit between retributive theory and restitution).
39 Incapacitation is sometimes included with rehabilitation, deterrence and retribu-
tion as a goal of criminal sanctioning. See generally Greenberg, The Incapacitative Effect of
Imprisonment: Some Estimates, 9 L. & Soc. REV. 541 (1975). Few if any claims, however,
have been made with respect to the incapacitative potential of restitution.
For a general overview of the evolving debate among scholars and policymakers
regarding the proper aims of sentencing in the criminal process, see F. ALLEN, THE DE-
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restitution ordered by a criminal court correspond to the actual in-
jury suffered by the victim; it is contemplated that many victims may
receive only partial compensation from the offender.
40
For two reasons, these theories of restitution are unlikely to be
of much help in guiding the development of doctrine in this area.
First, they fail to account for the complementary relationship which
exists between the adjudicatory and sanctioning phases of the crimi-
nal process. In addition, they do not comprehend the larger institu-
tional4' role which each plays in creating social cohesion. While
repairing victims' injuries and punishing offenders' wrongs are im-
portant public interests, this article will demonstrate that the pri-
mary function of the criminal law in both the guilt-finding and
sentencing stages is more ideological 42 in nature.
CLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 7-10 (1981); McAnany, supra note 33, at 17-20. With
respect to the relationship between that debate and the changing contours of the restitu-
tion discussion, compare Symposium, Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round
Table, 8J. PUB. L. 191 (1959), and Symposium, Compensation to Victims of Crimes of Personal
Violence: An Examination of the Scope and Problem, 50 MINN. L. REv. 211 (1965), with Sym-
posium, Victim's Rights, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1 (1984). See also Keve, supra note 33, at
59 (reporting that by 1977 restitution projects were "reluctant even to suggest rehabili-
tation of the offender as one of the purposes of the programs").
40 Barnett describes this approach as follows:
Punitive restitution is an attempt to gain the benefits of pure restitution...
while retaining the perceived advantages of the paradigm of punishment .... The
amount of payment is determined not by the actual harm but by the ability of the
offender to pay.
Barnett, supra note 3, at 364 (emphasis omitted).
A third view of restitution is based upon practical necessity rather than theory.
Without relying upon a particular reading of historical or anthropological materials or
upon claims with respect to the rehabilitative, deterrent or retributive potential of the
practice, adherents of this view assert that the use of restitution is justified as a practical
and efficient means of repaying the injuries suffered by crime victims. Essential to this
point of view is the observation that neither tort remedies nor public compensation cur-
rently provide adequate relief to persons victimized by criminal offenses. See generally
Harland, supra note 1, at 120; Goldstein, supra note 6, at 532.
41 Roscoe Pound provided a useful definition of the term "institution." In his view,
institutions are "things established with a continuous existence apart from any persons
for the time being, certain of whose activities are organized without their personalities
being included, and setting up organs of authority and procedures of their own .... " R.
POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAw 9 (1942). See also R.M. MACIVER, COMMUNITY
157-61 (1928)(describing the role of institutions in "promoting social solidarity").
42 The terms "ideology" and "ideological," as used herein, refer to the combined
concepts of "particular ideology" and "total ideology" as formulated by Karl Mann-
heim. See generally K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 9 (1936). Mannheim used these
terms to refer to the created relationship of individuals to their collective. Hence, par-
ticular ideology "means that opinions, statements, propositions, and systems of ideas
are not taken at their face value but are interpreted in the light of the life-situations of
the one who expresses them." Id. at 56. Total ideology, in turn, refers to the "charac-
teristics and composition of the total structure of the mind" of a given group of people
in a given epoch. Id. Taken together, the notion is that the ideas expressed by an indi-
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It is tempting to treat these two stages of the criminal process as
separate social phenomena, with adjudication understood as serving
some sort of socializing or educative function and sentencing an in-
strumental and largely coercive role. The thesis of this article, in
contrast, is that both stages must be seen as coordinate pieces of a
larger institutional structure which operates in contemporary soci-
ety to create a sense of community. 43 This analysis takes as its start-
ing premise the idea that "the internal, voluntary motivation of the
individual to conform to group norms" is a more effective means of
obtaining social cohesion than is coercive social control.44 Volun-
tary social control, in turn, depends upon the existence of a general
perception among community members that they share some com-
mon characteristic and some common social space.45 Building upon
these premises, this article illustrates that criminal adjudication and
sentencing work together to create and reinforce an ideology in
vidual in a social group are "an outgrowth of the collective life of which he [or she]
partakes." Id. at 57.
43 Cf. F. TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY (C. Lommis trans. 1963).
44 Roucek, The Concept of Social Control in American Sociology, in SOCIAL CONTROL FOR
THE 1980s 11, 12 (J.S. Roucek ed. 1978).
Significant recent attention has been given to the proposition that the regular use of
restitution to make crime victims whole would have the effect of reducing the public's
distrust of and alienation from the criminal justice system. It is thought that this effect,
in turn, would tend to increase the rate of crime reporting and would encourage witness
cooperation in prosecutions. Goldstein, supra note 6, at 518-20; Hudson, supra note 25,
at 29, 62. Although this attempt to link the victim's interest in restitution to the commu-
nity's interest in crime control is logical and appears to be a compelling justification for
the increased use of restitutive sanctions, a wider view of the relationship between the
criminal justice system and the "crime problem" in contemporary society renders it in-
adequate. The United States Department of Justice's statistics, for example, indicate
that less than twenty percent of all offenses known to the police in 1981 were cleared by
arrest. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATSTICS FOR 1983 451, 453 (1984). Therefore, even in a hypothetical
world of full reporting and full cooperation by crime victims, the vast majority of crimi-
nal offenses would go unsolved and unsanctioned. Rather than understanding the crim-
inal justice system as an institution designed to control crime by responding to
individual incidents of wrongdoing, the more accurate view is that the criminal process
is but one of a number of social control institutions typically in place in any community,
functioning to control crime by "suggestive" influence. Roucek, supra, at 121. See also
Kittrie, Symbolic Justice-The Trial of Criminal Cases (Paper presented to Indiana Lawyers
Committee) (1978), reprinted in part in N. KiTRmIE & E. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING
AND CORRECTIONS 182 (1981)(courts offer "opportunity for the stylized enactment of
selected performances").
45 See generally K. ERICKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS 8-9 (1966). "The people of a com-
munity spend most of their lives in close contact with one another, sharing a common
sphere of experience which makes them feel that they belong to a special 'kind' and live
in a special 'place'." Id. at 9. Cf. Roucek, supra note 44, at 12 ("internal control is espe-
cially effective in a homogeneous society characterized by consensus as to norms of
conduct").
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which autonomous individuals are understood as relevant subjects
for the ascription of responsibility.
This ideology of individuality, like all ideologies, serves a defini-
tional function and a "mapping" function.46 By creating autono-
mous individuals and representing them to the community as
reality, the criminal process teaches each community member to
view himself or herself as "the author of his [or her] actions."
47
This definitional work is essential in ordering satisfactory relation-
ships in contemporary society, because it produces the shared com-
mon characteristic of individual free will, which is a prerequisite to
the construction of clear communal boundaries.
The ideology of individuality also serves a mapping function.48
Communities not only exist in a particular geographical space; they
also carve out a common social space bounded by an invisible sense
of belonging.49 In contemporary society, it is at the level of the con-
scious individual-the autonomous subject endowed with free will-
that this process of locating communal boundaries occurs. AsJame-
son writes, the ideology of individuality is the "indispensable map-
ping fantasy by which the individual subject invents a 'lived'
relationship with the collective systems which otherwise by defini-
tion would exclude him [or her] .... "50
Of course, application of this theory of criminal adjudication
and sentencing is not limited to problems surrounding the use of
restitution in the criminal process. The theoretical literature which
has grown up in the restitution area, however, does provide a singu-
lar opportunity for the elaboration of some of these ideas, because it
raises questions of purpose in a larger cultural context, and because
it presses upon problems concerning the relationship between guilt-
finding and sanctioning. Consequently, this article begins with a
consideration of some of the most provocative work which has been
undertaken concerning restitution, in order to generate further ob-
servations about the ideological functioning of the criminal process.
Section II examines the historical claim, advanced by advocates of
the "restitutionary theory ofjustice"- that tribal societies drew no
distinction between private and public wrongs-and presents addi-
tional data which suggest that a tribal law of crimes did exist. Sec-
tion III takes a closer look at the punishment of criminal conduct in
46 Jameson, Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic Criticism, and the
Problem of the Subject, 55/56 YALE FRENCH STUD. 338, 394 (1977).
47 R. Coward &J. Ellis, Language and Materialism 77 (1978).
48 Jameson, supra note 46, at 394.
49 K. Erickson, supra note 45, at 10.
50 Jameson, supra note 46, at 394.
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tribal societies and concludes that this social practice served the
function of creating and reinforcing an ideology of the group, which
mirrored the boundary-defining mechanisms there in place. 5' This
institutional analysis of crime in tribal society is undertaken in order
to create a model which then is employed to illustrate the role that
criminal law plays in contemporary Western society. Section IV re-
turns to the question of restitutionary sentencing as well as the of-
fense of conviction problem. Based on the ideas developed earlier
in the article, it argues that an order of restitution must reflect an
offender's offense of conviction, because the formal process of fix-
ing guilt ceases to be an effective ideological ritual52 which serves
the ordering requirements of the community when its description of
the offender's responsibility is replaced by some alternative descrip-
tion of the offender's "actual" guilt. The integrity of the adjudica-
tory ceremony, in short, lies in its capacity to articulate the nature of
the offender's freely willed conduct. This ceremony is undermined
when a court fashions a sentence which goes beyond the offender's
adjudicated guilt.
HISTORICAL BASES OF THE "RESTITUTIONARY THEORY OF JUSTICE"
Those writers who have adopted, in whole or in part, a "restitu-
tionary theory ofjustice" have turned to some version of the histori-
cal account presented below in order to show that the 'natural'5 3
response to offensive behavior has always been to order offenders to
repay their victims. 5 4 They proffer historical data in support of their
claims that contemporary Western society's dual legal system was
forged from an earlier set of legal institutions in which no distinc-
tion had yet been drawn between criminal sanctions and civil reme-
51 Although much of the information in Section III comes from anthropological work
on contemporary cultures, the past tense is employed for the sake of uniformity. The
author acknowledges that this decision mirrors the tendency of western writers to think
of extant stateless or simple societies as anachronistic. The truth, of course, is that the
progression of cultures in western history from simple, stateless societies into increas-
ingly complex social organizations is far fron universal.
52 For a discussion of the role of ritual in social organization, see generally THE
ROOTS OF RrrUALS (J. Shaughnessy ed. 1973).
53 In their fascinating anthropological survey of restitution, Nader and Combs-Schil-
ling have pointed out the tendency, common among many commentators, to make erro-
neous generalizations in order to support assertions that one or another cultural
response to antisocial behavior is "universal" and hence "natural." The real value of
historical and anthropological studies, they argue, is to bring into sharper focus cross-
cultural similarities in the functions and purposes which restitution has been called upon
to serve. Nader & Combs-Schilling, Restitution in Cross-Cultural Persepctive, in REsTrrTmON
IN CRIMINALJUSTICE 27 (1977). See also S. SCHAFER, supra note 2, at 3 (making a some-
what more modest claim with respect to the importance of the historical analysis).
54 See, e.g., Silving, supra note 25, at 236.
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dies.5 5 These writers argue that the growth of a separate criminal
law, centered around the fictive interests of the collective, was an
unnecessary consequence of the rise of nation-states and has de-
prived unfairly the victim of his or her rightful place in the pro-
cess. 5 6 From this perspective, the practice of restitution is justified
as a means of reinserting the victim's interest into the process which
society has constructed to respond to criminal behavior.
5 7
A. THE "RESTITUTIONARY THEORY OF JUSTICE" DEFINED
The historical account which is at the core of the "restitutionary
theory ofjustice" hinges on three basic assertions. First, pre-feudal
societies treated all instances of harm as a private matter and made
no distinction between criminal and civil remedies. Second, when
the two spheres began to diverge, punishment replaced restitution
as the primary consequence of what was termed "criminal" behav-
ior. Third, accompanying the development of this new penal focus
for the "criminal" law were a number of alternative justifications for
proceeding against offenders, which were based upon false notions
of the community's interest.
These accounts generally start with an examination of the ways
in which "primitive" or tribal societies dealt with antisocial behav-
ior. In tribal cultures, an individual was understood as synecdochi-
cally represented by his or her family.58 When an offense was
committed, all of the victim's kin were understood to have been vic-
timized, and all of the offender's relatives were held responsible. 59
This group orientation was central in determining responses to of-
fensive behavior, because it made little sense to speak about the
blameworthiness of an individual when responsibility for his or her
act attached to a number of persons who, though related to the of-
fender, had nothing to do with the commission of the act. The con-
cern, therefore, was not with establishing the offender's moral
responsibility, but rather insuring that the victimized family received
some equivalent satisfaction.60 Significantly, the process of exacting
55 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 6, at 529.
56 Silving, supra note 25, at 236-37.
57 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 6, at 529-32.
58 E. ZIEGENHAGEN, VICTIMS, CRIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL 34 (1977).
59 Jacob, The Concept of Restitution: An Historical Overview, in REsTrrTUON IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 45 (1977); Silving, supra note 25, at 237.
60 The kinship system not only operated in a manner that made one's group re-
sponsible for individual behavior but also was based upon different objectives than
those that exist in contemporary society. Today, action taken against a criminal by
the police and courts has as its objective the suppression of crime, but in the kinship
system, highest priority was placed on satisfaction of the victim and his kin derived
from extracting vengeance from the perpretrator and his kin.
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satisfaction from the offending clan, the "blood-feud," 61 was not an
embryonic form of communal punishment; it was, we are told, a
matter of familial revenge.
62
This process of providing satisfaction to victimized families
eventually was routinized. Some cultures adopted a dueling method
for settling disputes which required some form of a regulated fight
between representatives of the two families. 63 Other societies de-
veloped elaborate ceremonies in which members of the offending
clan voluntarily submitted to a throwing of spears or a hacking with
knives. 64 In cultures that had evolved to the point of generating
surplus commodities, the blood-feud could be resolved by way of
''composition," which involved the transfer of valued goods from
the offending clan to the victimized family.65 Regardless of the
form, the injury inflicted upon the offender and his or her kin re-
flected the damage sustained by the victim and his or her family. In
this scheme, the moral responsibility of the individual offender was
of no consequence. 66
As the exchange of goods between kinship groups became an
acceptable alternative to violence, two additional features character-
istic of modern legal institutions began to emerge. The first in-
volved the elaboration of regularized rules governing the process of
composition. 67 Initially a function of custom, these rules gradually
evolved into stable procedural and substantive codes. 68 Both the
primacy of restitution and the emphasis on consequence rather than
culpability were characteristics of the process of composition from
its inception and were carried over into these early attempts at codi-
fication.69 The object of these rudimentary documents was to set up
a mechanism by which individual harms could be translated into
monetary equivalents. Rather than standing as statements of some
E. ZIEGENHAGEN, supra note 58, at 35.
61 Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of its Past History and an Analysis of its Present
Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 71, 71-72 (1970).
62 Id.
63 E. ZIEGENHAGEN, supra note 58, at 36.
64 A.S. DIAMOND, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW AND ORDER 22 (1951).
65 W. SEAGLE, THE HISTORY OF LAw 42 (1946). Stephen Schafer has argued that the
growth of composition was correlated with the development of notions of private prop-
erty. S. SCHAFER, THE VICTIM AND HIS CRIMINAL 4-5, (1968).
66 E. ZIEGENHAGEN, supra note 58, at 36; Silving, supra note 25, at 238.
67 Barnett, supra note 3, at 351. See also E. ZIEGENHAGEN, supra note 58, at 45.
68 A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 137-53; H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 14 (16th ed.
1897).
69 "Quite unlike the laws found today in most 'civilized' communities, the laws of
primitive societies contained monetary evaluations for most offenses as compensation to
the victim, not as punishment of the criminal." Laster, supra note 61, at 72 (footnotes
omitted).
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collective morality, it is claimed that the codes served a utilitarian
function.7
0
The second development of consequence was the appearance
of a central authority figure.71 With the advent of regularized rules
governing composition, there necessarily appeared a keeper of the
rules. This figure was an institutional actor responsible for insuring
that the participants adhered to prearranged procedures. 72 The in-
volvement of this figure of central authority began an evolutionary
process in which the natural tension between the victim's interests
and those of the mediating institution ultimately were resolved. 73 It
is the final resolution of this tension or, more precisely, the com-
plete substitution of the institution's interests for the victim's which
forms the core of the historical tale reported by advocates of this
theory of restitution. 74
At first, the rule keeper's role was entirely facilitative. If the
parties to the dispute were able to work out a private settlement or if
70 An argument is sometimes made that, because codification is a social enterprise,
the restitutionary sanctions included in these early codes necessarily served the collec-
tive function of punishment as well as the private goal of victim restitution. In fact, we
are told that these early legal documents were understood as consensual guidelines
rather than positive rules. Laster, supra note 61, at 73. If, for any reason, the need for
restitution was obviated prior to any formal proceeding, those proceedings would be
suspended and the matter would be at an end. The codes came into existence to insure
an orderly and consistent transfer of goods subsequent to the commission of an offense.
Once that transfer had taken place or once the pressure for such a transfer disappeared,
no further societal interest remained. H. OPPENHEIMER, THE RATIONAL OF PUNISHMENT
162 (1913)(the state "did not include among its functions the repression of wrongs be-
tween individual and individual, between family and family, between clan and clan.").
On the other hand, Schafer has identified certain ancient codes-including the law
of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi-which required the offender to pay restitution in
multiples of the value of the damage done (e.g., fourfold restitution for stolen sheep). S.
SCHAFER, supra note 2, at 4. He takes this as evidence that "the obligation of payment
.. was enforced not in the interests of the victim, but rather for the purpose of increas-
ing the severity of the criminal's punishment." Id. The apparent conflict between these
positions is diminished, however, once one realizes that "punishment," in Schafer's
view, included the victim's interest in vengeance. See supra note 33. Hence, he con-
cludes that these codes illustrate "the common origin of punishment and victim com-
pensation." Schafer, Victim Compensation and Responsibility, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 55, 56
(1970).
71 Diamond reports that even in the first stage of economic development which he
has identified and labelled as the "Food-Gathering" stage, see infra note 91, the "old
men of the tribe would sometimes take it upon themselves to mediate feuds between
kinship groups." A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 22.
72 "Among the more advanced peoples of the [second agricultural grade] . . . the
peacemaking activity is more and more exercised by the chief, with the assistance of his
elders, and so we reach the threshold of a system of courts of trial." Id. at 43.
73 "The decline of the role of the individual victim and his kin is, in many respects,
the history of the rise of the state and its law." E. ZIEGENHAGEN, supra note 58, at ix. See
also Jacob, supra note 59, at 46-47.
74 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 3, at 352-54.
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the injured party preferred to continue the blood-feud, there would
be no invocation of the rules and no participation by the figure of
central authority. 75 Little by little, however, the rule keeper's inter-
vention increased, thereby transforming the nature of the process.
76
Not only were settlement negotiations gradually taken over and di-
rected by the central authority figure, but elaborate tables were de-
veloped containing pre-established amounts to be awarded the
victim. 77 Once this award system was implemented, it was only a
matter of time before the proceeds were being shared between the
actual victim of the offense and the previously neutral rule keeper.78
Eventually, as the sovereign authority of the rule keeper in-
creased, his or her share of the composition payment absorbed the
whole amount. 79 As a consequence, the creation of a new interest
was seen to flow from the commission of a "criminal" act. The of-
fender was now subjected to a proceeding under the rules not for
the purpose of assisting the victim in recovering his or her loss, but
rather to vindicate the interest of the sovereign.8 0 In fact, this newly
created state interest so eclipsed the prior interest of the individual
victim that a private attempt on the part of that victim to obtain what
had previously been his or her proper compensation-in short, to
engage in composition-was itself held to constitute a criminal
offense.
81
75 In fact, many of the early codes explicitly provided the victimized clan with a
choice of remedies. They could either accept composition or continue the blood-feud.
E. ZIEGENHAGEM, supra note 58, at 44-45.
76 Id. at 58-61;Jacob, supra note 59, at 47. But cf. Barnett, supra note 3, at 352 (shift
from restitution to punishment was "sudden and rapid").
77 See, e.g., A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 148-51 (discussing the Code of Ethelbert,
which was the first of the great English codes). "The Code of Ethelbert contains an
absurdly elaborate and orderly tariff of forty clauses specifying the sum payable for every
kind of injury, beginning at the top of the body with the wrong seizing of a man by the
hair, and ending with the loss of a toe nail." Id. at 148. See also Jacob, supra note 59, at
47.
78 The portion of the compensation payment which was claimed by the central au-
thority figure is variously described as a wite or fine, Laster, supra note 61, at 75, or as a
commission payable to the mediator in exchange for his or her assistance in administer-
ing the process. Barnett, supra note 3, at 353 (quoting H. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 70,
at 162-63).
79 S. SCHAFER, supra note 2, at 6-7; W. TALLACK, REPARATION TO THE INJURED 11
(1900); Wolfgang, Victim Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50 MINN. L. REV. 223,
228 (1965).
80 See Laster, supra note 61, at 79.
81 Jacob, supra note 59, at 47. Blackstone explains that the crime of theftbote was com-
mitted when an injured party agreed to private restitution in exchange for a promise not
to prosecute. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 133 (1826).
The substitution of a central interest for a private interest as the primary concern of
the criminal law is said to have required a legitimating rationalization. Helen Silving has
identified such a rationalization through comparison with the practices of the tribal cul-
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According to the advocates of this historical reading, the grad-
ual substitution of the sovereign's interest for the private interest of
the victim took place in the context of a second evolutionary pro-
cess. This process involved the separation of a consideration of the
antisocial act's consequences from a consideration of the moral
characteristics of the offender. The former had been a primary con-
cern in a system which held restitution to victims as its goal; the
latter was now the focus of a set of rules concerned primarily with
guilt and punishment.8 2 On a formal plane, this distinction was im-
plemented by a division of the law into criminal and civil spheres.8
3
In practice, it meant that the individual victim had no significant role
to play within the criminal law and was relegated to seeking redress
by way of a civil suit for damages.
8 4
A final change reported was the replacement of punishment for
restitution as the goal of the system.8 5 This shift in function, while
distinct from the change of actors, owed its theoretical foundation
tures described above. Silving, supra note 25, at 237. She has argued that, just as the
tribal victim's interest was served by and through his or her family or kinship group, the
individual victim under this new social order also was led to believe that his or her inter-
ests were properly vindicated by and through the activities of the state. Id. Silving fur-
ther argues that this rationalization is sheer fiction because the nature of this new social
order was such that no synecdochical relationship similar to that which existed in the
earlier society could possibly operate.
To the individual the old system of identification with the group offered certain
psychological compensations. In exchange for his loss of individual identity, he
gained the inner security which belonging to the group afforded. His loss was thus
actually repaired by indemnification of the group. Even in the event of his death, he
continued 'living' in and by the group. The feudal state at first purported to give
some similar assurance to the loyal vassal. But with the rise of the absolute state,
the old primitive type of group bond disappeared. The parental status of the mon-
arch was obviously fictitious .... Obviously, indemnification for the individual loss
was not meaningful in a sense even remotely comparable to the one time indemnifi-
cation of the tribe for such loss.
Id.
82 Silving, supra note 25, at 238.
83 See Goldstein, supra note 6, at 530. At any point in history, it is possible to identify
cultures at varying stages along an evolutionary path of cultural and economic develop-
ment. Cf. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 4-5 (setting forth the need for some form of
analytic framework by which social development can be described and studied). The
divergence of criminal and civil law is generally fixed in the English law of the twelfth
century. S. SCHAFER, supra note 2, at 2-12. It is argued that the introduction of feudal-
ism, A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 180-87; Laster, supra note 61, at 75, the growth in
the secular authority of the church, Fraher, The Theoretical Justificationfor the New Criminal
Law of the High Middle Ages: "Rei Publicae Interest, Ne Crimina Remaneant Impunita",
1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 577, and the rediscovery of Roman law by scholastic lawyers, 2 F.
POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 460 (1895), laid the founda-
tion for this important historical shift. See generally Barnett supra note 3, at 352. But see
also Fraher, supra (questioning whether a renewed interest in Roman law really did play a
role in the development of a separate criminal law).
84 See generally S. SCHAFER, supra note 2, at 7-8, 117.
85 Laster, supra note 61, at 77.
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to the aggrandized role of the state in the evolving criminal law.
Even if the proffered "fiction" that the victim's injury belonged to
the community had been accepted,8 6 the fact remained that the
sanction imposed did not in any obvious fashion make the commu-
nity whole in the manner in which restitution repaired the harm
done to an individual victim.8 7 As a consequence, a variety of alter-
native justifications for criminal sanctioning necessarily developed.
Some held that punishment served to maintain order, a public inter-
est of clear import in these developing cultures.88 Others argued
that a need to deter anti-social behavior was at the core of the sover-
eign's growing concern with punishment.89 Whatever the justifica-
tion, however, the final result was the conspicuous substitution of
punishment for restitution as the designated work of criminal law.
B. EXISTENCE OF PUBLIC WRONGS
The claims made by advocates of the "restitutionary theory of
justice" represent a misreading of the available historical and an-
thropological data.90 A.S. Diamond reports that among peoples at
the first stage of economic development he has identified, the food-
gathering tribes, 91 a class of "public wrongs"9 2 typically existed
86 In Medieval Europe, we are told, the kings and lesser feudal lords took an increas-
ing interest in local disputes not principally to help preserve the peace, but rather to
generate revenues. E. ZIEGENHAGEN, supra note 58, at 63. But see infra text accompany-
ing note 108.
87 Laster, supra note 61, at 77-78.
88 See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 37-38 (4th ed. 1938).
89 See Laster, supra note 61, at 78.
90 On the basis of interpretations of early Hellenic, Roman and Teutonic codes,
Maine concludes that the law of wrongs in which injuried parties or their confeder-
ates sought repairment from the wrongdoer antedated the law of crimes in which
the state being injuried soughtjustice .... It is very doubtful that this conclusion
can be supported by field investigations of unadvanced peoples by modern
anthropologists.
W. RECKLESS, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 260 n.1 (1940). Gerhard Mueller has framed the in-
quiry in the following terms:
[Ilt is quite significant .. .whether community reaction to a wrong in primitive
society is in the form or for the purpose of retaliation, deterrence, resocialization or
neutralization, all of which are present-day theories. If it is in any of these forms
that society reacts to a wrong, then we must conceive of the wrong as a crime,
whereas if the reaction to a wrong is only in the form of exacting compensation to
the person or group of persons (excepting the community itself as a group of per-
sons) harmed, then we must treat it as a tort.
Mueller, Tort, Crime and the Primitive, 46J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 303, 308-
09 (1955).
91 Diamond has created a series of classifications which attempt to organize the his-
torical and anthropological data with respect to the economic development of human
society. He conceives of the various stages as "fundamental" and "based upon the de-
gree of control of a society over its environment." A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 4.
Diamond's first stage of economic development is the Food-Gathering stage. Peo-
ples at this stage of development exist by gathering food. They live in the Paleolithic
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alongside the more extensive class of private wrongs regularly de-
scribed in the restitutionary account. 93 The most significant feature
of these public wrongs was their incurrence of communal punish-
ment rather than a restitutionary response.94 To be sure, few be-
haviors were treated as public wrongs by the most "primitive" of
these tribes. 95 Nevertheless, the distinction between public and pri-
vate wrongs was recognized, and, as the economic and cultural ap-
paratuses of the food-gatherers evolved, offenses "against public
order" became increasingly common. 96
The treatment of harmful conduct in the first written codes re-
Age, and they have no metals or permanent dwellings and few domesticated animals. Id.
The second developmental stage is called the First Agricultural Grade. Peoples at this
stage have learned a rudimentary agriculture, although they continue to gather much of
their food. Id. The next stage is the Second Agricultural Stage. Societies at this point
of development belong to the Neolithic Age. They depend primarily upon agriculture
and live in semi-permanent houses. Id. at 4-5. The fourth and final stage of economic
advancement prior to the development of written codes of law is the Third Agricultural
Grade. Peoples at this level combine agriculture with the keeping of large animals.
They possess metals and live in permanent dwellings. Id. at 5.
Diamond's description of the peoples at each of these four stages is drawn primarily
from anthropological data. It is only when he discusses societies with written codes of
law that he turns to historical materials as well. See id. at 137-53.
92 Diamond defines "public wrongs" as "offences so outrageous that whether or not
some individual is hurt, they are a matter of public concern and their punishment a
matter for public action." Id. at 20 (footnote omitted). It is clear on the face of this
characterization that Diamond's identification of public wrongs among "primitive" cul-
tures goes directly to the three assertions made in the course of the preceeding histori-
cal account. Thus, we are told that pre-feudal societies did recognize a distinction
between criminal and civil wrongs, that these societies did employ punishment when
public wrongs were committed, and that they understood public wrongs as instances of
collective injury. Id.
93 A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 20.
94 See supra note 91.
95 In fact, Diamond informs us that many societies at this stage recognized incest as
the only public offense. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 20.
96 In addition to incest, murder by magic and several other "sacral offenses" were
treated as public offenses. Id. at 21.
The number of offenses treated punitively rather than by restitution remained rela-
tively stable from the late Food-Gatherers through the First Agricultural Grade. Id. at
34. Diamond does report, however, that the role of the tribal elders began to change at
this point. The elders began to play a more distinctive part in communal decisions of
guilt and punishment; in a few of these tribes, a sort of rudimentary criminal trial began
to appear. Id. at 35. The important aspect of this increasing activity on the part of the
elders is that it was specific to public offenses. Their role in cases of private wrongdoing
was limited to the mediating of private disputes. Id. "But in the same tribes that have
blood feuds or blood revenge, and seek wergild (compensation for injury sustained)
punitive procedures will be administered also by elders, councils, chiefs, or kings for
those offenses considered to be crimes against the tribe rather than private injuries." W.
RECKLESS, supra note 90, at 260.
The evidence suggests that the distinction between public and private wrongs was
maintained by peoples in the Second Agricultural Grade, A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64,
at 42, and during the Cattle-Keepers of the Third Agricultural Grade, penal sanctions-
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inforced the distinction between "criminal" and "civil" law. Ger-
hard Mueller has described a "dual system" in the early Germanic
code, the Leges Barbarorum. 97 He identifies a similar divergence of
public and private offenses in the Twelve Tables of Roman law98
and in the codes of Babylonia and ancient Palestine.99 In each of
these instances, Mueller concedes that the sphere of private offenses
was considerably larger than the category of behaviors punished as
"criminal" offenses.100 In none of these codes, however, does he
find evidence that an offense, once classified as public or "criminal,"
was ever subject to "civil" retaliation or compensation.10 1
Although the "Central Codes" of Western Europe dating from
A.D. 800 to 1100102 were replete with provisions for the use of com-
position, 0 3 they actually contained an expanding range of offenses
considered criminal wrongs. 104 In part, this expansion involved the
criminalization of otherwise civil wrongs when they were committed
under special circumstances. 10 5 More significant, however, was the
increasing recognition that certain acts were to be treated as wrongs
against public order whenever and however they were commit-
ted. 10 6 Diamond acknowledges that several of these new criminal
particularly death-regularly were employed as collective responses to "criminal"
wrongs. Id. at 107.
97 Mueller, supra note 90, at 309. Compare 49 LEx THURINGORUM ("Who not wilfully
but by some accident kills a human being or wounds him, shall pay the lawful compensa-
tion") with 24 LEx SAXONUM ("Who conspires either against the Kingdom or the life of
the King of France or his sons, shall be punished with the capital punishment"). The
Leges Barbarorum, which includes both the Lex Thuringorum and the Lex Saxonum
dates from about the sixth century A.D., or about six hundred years before the date at
which the restitutionary theory's historical account fixes the beginning of the divergence
between criminal and civil law in England. See supra note 83.
98 Mueller, supra note 90, at 312-13. In the Twelve Tables, for example, removal of
the sacred boundary stones, sorcery and poisoning, singing of libelous songs, nocturnal
devastation of crops, and several other similar behaviors were met not by a call for resti-
tution, but by provisions mandating severe punishment. Mueller, Victims of Criminal Vio-
lence, 8 J. PUB. L. 218, 223 (1959). For the contrary view that Roman law did not
distinguish sharply between civil and criminal offenses, see Alexander, Compensation In a
Roman Criminal Law, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 521 (1984)(Roman extortion statutes per-
formed functions of restitution and deterrence).
99 Babylonian law recognized a "distinct area of criminal law" which included "witch-
craft, offenses against the administration ofjustice and religion.... [and] crimes against
the sex taboo." Mueller, supra note 90, at 314.
100 Id. at 313.
101 Id. at 315.
102 Diamond fixes this stage at 800 A.D. to 1000 A.D. in France and 900 A.D. to 1100
A.D. in England. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 167.
103 Barnett, supra note 3, at 352.
104 A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 192.
105 Id. In particular, offenses directed against members of the King's household or
committed in the King's palace are now treated as criminal wrongs. Id.
106 Id. at 192-93
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offenses, which were punished by fines, provided an important
source of revenue for feudal lords and barons. 10 7 There were also
crimes, however, "that are bootless-that is to say, not amendable
by money-such as treason and murder and false coining, and some
of these involve death and confiscation of property."'
08
III. SOCIETAL RESPONSES TO CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
It is clear that, from the earliest stages of economic develop-
ment through the end of the feudal period, human society did rec-
ognize a distinction between public and private wrongs.10 9 The real
issue with regard to these early societies is why they set off certain
offenses to be treated with "criminal" sanctions, and why those of-
fenses were so few in number compared to the vast range of behav-
iors dealt with through the blood-feud and, later, through
composition.
A variety of theories have been advanced in response to these
questions. Perhaps, as some have argued, acts which provoked com-
munal punishment in pre-feudal societies necessarily were treated
as "crimes" because restitution to the individual victims was not
possible. 10 Alternatively, Mueller has hypothesized that the dis-
tinction drawn by tribal cultures between public and private wrongs
turned on the nature of the harm caused by the relevant conduct."'
107 Id. at 193.
108 Id. TheJutes, Danes and Norsemen held certain acts-including treason, coward-
ice, homicide by waylaying and poisoning-to be botleas, or non-compensable and pun-
ishable by death. Mueller, supra note 98, at 223.
109 "Mhe majority of primitive communities recognize... that over and above the
law of torts there is generally a law of crimes, or outrages resented not by a restricted
group of relatives, but by the entire community or directors" R. LOWiE, PRIMrrIvE SOCr-
ETY 425 (1925). See also Mueller, supra note 98, at 223.
110 Laster has argued, for example, that certain ancient wrongs, including incest,
witchcraft, bestiality and other sacral offenses, were punished as crimes because of the
absence of an individual harm. Laster, supra note 61, at 73. While this theory does have
some explanatory force with respect to the least developed tribal cultures, where incest
was commonly recognized as the sole criminal wrong, see supra note 95, it ceases to be
useful in explaining the later pre-feudal peoples' practice of punishing witchcraft as a
criminal offense. As Diamond makes clear, witchcraft was understood as the use of
magic by an offender for private ends, and it often was thought to be the cause of the
death or injury of some particular community member. Individual victims of witchcraft
or their families, therefore, were available to receive restitution if the community had
decided to employ that remedy. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 21, 25, 34. Moreover,
by the early feudal period, other offenses, including homicide by waylaying and poison-
ing, were treated as noncompensable crimes. Individual victims were again able to re-
ceive restitution if the community had chosen to provide it. Mueller, supra note 98, at
223.
111 Mueller, supra note 90, at 314; Mueller, supra note 98, at 224.
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In his view, "primeval crimes," 112 by definition, were behaviors
which threatened the "very existence of society itself."'
13 Most of-
fenses, he explains, culminated in private blood-feuds or composi-
tion rather than in communal punishment, because so few behaviors
were capable of endangering these rather simple social
organizations. 1 "4
A closer examination of the collective practice of punishment in
tribal societies, however, provides strong evidence for a slightly dif-
ferent explanation. The identification and punishment of "crimi-
nal" behavior there, as in contemporary societies, involved more
than a communal response to a particular failure of social con-
trol.115 The response also served the constructive function of rein-
forcing the institutional machinery by which social cohesion was
obtained in the first instance. Criminal sanctioning among Dia-
mond's food-gatherers, like modem criminal law, was a social prac-
tice' l 6 directly involved in the collective's ideological organization.
Of course, as the other institutional features of a society change, the
system of criminal law within that society also evolves. 17 Neverthe-
112 Mueller, supra note 90, at 323.
113 Mueller, supra note 98, at 224. Mueller's view is that "primitive" cultures drew a
distinction between "penal law" on the one hand and "criminal justice" on the other.
Both, according to Mueller, contained the roots of our modern criminal law. Mueller,
supra note 90, at 315. "Penal law" was characterized by punishment for offenses which
endangered the community itself, while "criminal justice," which took the form of blood
vengeance, involved the expression of notions of "justice" and "fairness" among the
participants. Id. It was only much later, Mueller says, that the law of compensation
came to take over for vengeance reactions. Id. Certain similarities to Mueller's thesis
are discernible in Schafer's reading of history, particularly the view that modern criminal
law represents an amalgam of collective and individual interests. See supra note 70. As
Schafer wrote: "Crime upsets the balance not only between the criminal and society,
but between the criminal and the individual victim." S. SCHAFER, supra note 2, at 118.
114 Rather than to act criminally, the community acted civilly, and that means ur-
banely or politely. The fairly unemotional and thus more rational civil sanction was
used in lieu of the emotion laden criminal sanction. Usually the harmed person is a
private individual. The harm to the community which may be involved is regarded
as purely coincidental, not requiring community reaction. Then as now, only the
most severe wrongs were singled out for community reaction or punishment, the
only difference between then and now being that the list of vital values, requiring
state protection, is long now and was short then, which incidentally, indicates that
states grow more patriarchal with maturity. Primitive society succeeded in main-
taining an orderly society with a minimum of effort, where we can succeed only by
drawing an appreciable portion of the population into state service.
Mueller, supra note 98, at 224.
115 For an overview of social control theory, see generally Roucek, supra note 44.
116 For a discussion of the distinction between formal and informal social practices,
see Roucek, supra note 44, at 11.
117 "The criminal law has quite rightly been called one of the most faithful mirrors of
a given civilization, reflecting the fundamental values of which the latter rests. When-
ever these values change, the criminal law must follow suit." H. MANNHEIM, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE & SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 2-3 (1946).
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less, the relationship between the foundational collective assump-
tions of tribal peoples and their treatment of "criminal" offenders
provides a good starting point for an analysis of the ideological
function of the criminal law, because it brings this institutional role
into sharp focus.
A. THE PUNISHMENT OF "CRIMES" AS A SOCIAL PRACTICE IN TRIBAL
SOCIETY
The people of any community, whether tribal, feudal or con-
temporary, derive an important sense of fixedness from their partici-
pation in the collective process of drawing boundaries. 118
Communities, in this regard, are "boundary maintaining," ' 1 9 not
only because they exist in a particular geographical space but also
because they carve out some sort of a "social space."'
120
In general, social boundaries are located, in any community, at
the point at which behavior deemed appropriate "in the special uni-
verse of the group" is distinguished from behavior deemed inappro-
priate. 121 Because the process of boundary defining is, however,
essentially the process of describing the conditions of community
membership, judgments with respect to the propriety of behavior
must carry consequences for the social actors thought to be respon-
sible for the conduct in the first place. 122 To describe a given act as
"deviant" is to make a statement about the actor's place with refer-
ence to the boundaries of the community. 123 Therefore, in order to
translate judgments regarding behavior into information concern-
ing membership in the community, some general understanding as
to the relationship between actor and act must be present.
Among the food-gatherers and other tribal peoples, the kinship
group was the relevant social actor whose place in the community
118 See generally K. ERICKSON, supra note 45, at 8-9.
119 Id. at 10. "When one describes any system as boundary maintaining, one is saying
that it controls the fluctuation of its constituent parts so that the whole retains a limited
range of activity, a given pattern of constancy and stability, within the larger environ-
ment." Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 10-11.
122 Id.
123 To begin with, the only material found in a society for making boundaries is the
behavior of its members .... And the interactions which do the most effective job
of locating and publicizing the group's outer edges would seem to be those which
take place between deviant persons on the one side and official agents of the com-
munity on the other. The deviant is a person whose activities have moved outside
the margins of the group, and when the community calls him [or her] to account for





was governed by judgments of its behavior. 124 Because repon-
sibility for an individual's conduct generally was absorbed by his or
her kin, 125 the statement that a particular act was inappropriate was
likely to be understood as conveying information about the mem-
bership of the responsible family in the tribe. 126 The individual par-
ticipated in the collective process of defining boundaries only
through the agency of his or her family.' 2 7 Perhaps for this reason,
124 "Individual acts were very closely associated with the behavior of the group to
which the person belonged, and one's individual responsibility was in that sense trans-
ferred to one's group." E. ZIEGENHAGEN, supra note 58, at 34. In fact, the blood-feud
was made possible only by virtue of the oppositional relationship the victimized clan and
the offending clan held with the tribe. Cf. L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW 9
(1971)(feud and law distinguished on ground that former is an "intergroup phenom-
ena," while latter is an "intragroup affair"). Sometimes, however, there was "not a large
difference between 'community' which is concerned with punishing a public or criminal
offense and the injured party and his or her clan or totemic group or friends who are
concerned with obtaining satisfaction for a private wrong." A.S. DIAMOND, supra note
64, at 25. In such instances, the line between civil and criminal wrongs was of little
consequence.
125 The basic unit of population within the food-gathering community was the clan.
Each of these homogeneous kinship groups lived a semi-nomadic life, moving about a
large but circumscribed territory gathering food. Typically, other similar groups also
lived by roving about the same territory. Together, these several families, who spoke
the same language and shared social relations, constituted a tribe. A.S. DIAMOND, supra
note 64, at 8-9. The most important feature of the primary kinship group was the de-
gree to which the individual was subsumed by the whole. Due to an intense commonal-
ity of background and experience, little or no opportunity was offered for the
development of individual personality, and each member of a family stood as a micro-
cosm of his or her clan. People lived their lives in and through their kinship group, and
distinctions rarely were drawn between individuals within a family. Id.; E. DURKHEIM,
SELECTED WRITINGS 25 (A. Giddens ed. 1972) (translated excerpt from E. DURKHEIM,
THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1960)). The response to injurious behavior gener-
ally was collective, both in its source and expression. The conduct of one member of a
family was assumed by the whole, and harm to one member was felt by all of his or her
kin. E. ZIEGENHAGEN, supra note 58, at 25 ("individuals living in a communal situation
and sharing the good or bad fortunes of the group as thier own"). In the words of Emile
Durkheim, the individual clan member was "envelop[ed]" by the "collective conscience"
of the group. E. DURKHEIM, supra, at 139.
In the discussion which follows, the terms "family," "clan," and "kinship group"
are used interchangeably. To a certain extent, this usage differs from the typical practice
in anthropological writing of distinguishing between primary family groups and larger
kinship systems. See generally KINSHIP AND CULTURE (F. Hsu ed. 1971).
126 The confrontation between "deviants" and "official agents of the community" has
been described as a boundary defining ritual. See supra note 123. Erickson defines a
deviant as "a person whose activities have moved outside the margins of the group .. "
K. ERICKSON, supra note 45, at 11. Because tribal societies transferred responsibility for
individual behavior to one's family, however, the definition of a deviant must be broad-
ened to refer to an offending family rather than to an offending individual. See supra
note 124. Therefore, Erickson's model of the ritual must also be revised so that it is
understood as a confrontation between a deviant family on the one side and the remain-
der of the community on the other.
127 Presentations are so focused upon the role and status of the individual that he
[or she] appears to participate directly in the life of the society as a whole. As a
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social scientists long have stressed the role that kinship groupings
played in maintaining social cohesion in tribal societies. 128 In fact,
any attempt to understand the social structure of tribal cultures
must begin with an examination of the institutions which these peo-
ples developed in order to regulate family relationships.' 29
The first of these institutions to appear pertained to mar-
riage.13 0 Considered as a collective institution, the complex of rules
which tribal communities developed to govern marriage functioned
to teach individuals about the membership of the various families in
the tribe and about the relationship each of those kinship groups
held to one another.'13 In order to accomplish these tasks, the rules
generally addressed three distinct issues. First, the rules almost uni-
versally contained prohibitions against marriage between members
of the same family. 13 2 Scholars such as Parsons and Farber have
suggested that these prohibitions helped maintain the unity of the
kinship group by preventing jealousy and competition among close
relatives, 3 3 and by reinforcing the similarities of individuals within
a given clan.' 3 4 Second, the rules often contained provisions estab-
lishing marriage alliances between families. Claude Levi-Strauss,
among others, has argued that the rules governing which families
could intermarry combined with the rules prohibiting intraclan mar-
riages to form a "principle of reciprocity."' 1 5 In his view, this com-
bination of prescriptive and proscriptive custom operated to
stimulate cooperation between kinship groups within a tribe.' 3 6 Fi-
consequence, a misleading impression of a "monolithic society" consisting of inter-
acting individuals, rather than a complex society composed of subgroups of differ-
ent membership inclusiveness, is likely to be created.
L. POSPISIL, supra note 124, at 98.
128 See generally E. HARTLAND, PRIMrrIvE SOCIETY: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE FAMILY AND
THE RECKONING OF DESCENT (1969).
129 Id. See also B. FARBER, COMPARATIvE KINSHIP SYSTEMS 9-14 (1968).
130 A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 14.
131 In discussing the educative function of marriage among the Food-Gatherers (i.e.,
its function was "to teach"), the author refers to Erickson's notion that members of a
community "learn" about boundaries through the mediating influence of collective in-
stitutions on individual interactions. K. ERICKSON, supra note 45, at 10-11.
For a discussion of the very different role that marriage plays as an institution of
social control in contemporary cultures, see Schoppmeyer, Marriage and Family, in So-
CIAL CONTROL FOR THE 1980s 91 (J. Roucek ed. 1978).
132 The individual families were "exogamous" units, so marriage within a single fam-
ily generally was prohibited. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 14. See also B. FARBER,
supra note 129, at 3.
133 See, e.g., Parsons, The Incest Taboo in Relation to Social Structure and the Socialization of
the Child, 5 BRTrr. J. Soc. 101 (1954).
134 B. FARBER, supra note 129, at 3.




nally, most of these cultures developed strict rules as to which of the
two families to a marriage would absorb the new couple and its
progeny.' 37 These rules insured that each individual held a primary
identification with only one kinship group, 38 again reinforcing the
corporate integrity of the family structure. 139
Taken together, these rules served to maintain a social struc-
ture which was built upon stable and distinctive family units tied to
other family units through bonds of mutual aid and cooperation.
On the one hand, the rules, by prohibiting marriages within a clan
and by restricting the list of potential mates available to any individ-
ual, insured the "orderly replacement" of the family culture into the
next generation. 40 At the same time, by creating links between par-
ticular families, the rules inhibited the potential that kinship groups
would grow differentiated from one another and assisted them in
defining collective boundaries which recognized their mutual
interdependence.141
Significantly, within this world of group thought and activity,
one particular type of harmful behavior, incest, was understood as
the act of an individual tribesperson. 142 This behavior, unlike most
other conduct, was met with punishment directed to the individual
offender rather than to his or her family. ' 43 With surprising regular-
ity, cultures at the food-gathering stage recognized and punished
incest, defined as marriage with a person with whom it was not per-
mitted,1 44 as their only "criminal" offense. 145
Clearly, Mueller's thesis, that tribal societies designated certain
behaviors as "crimes" because of the harm those behaviors caused
137 For example, marriage often was "matrilocal," which meant that the new couple
would take up residence with and become members of the wife's faimly. A.S. DIAMOND,
supra note 64, at 15.
138 The principle of "jural exclusiveness" states than an individual cannot hold mem-
bership in more than one kinship group. In its more extreme form, this principle
defeats the argument here advanced, because it suggests that exclusive family member-
ship exists from birth to death, and makes impossible a transfer of membership upon
marriage. B. FARBER, supra note 129, at 5-6. But cf. Fortes, The Structure of Unilineal De-
scent Groups, 55 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 17, 33 (1953)(link between kinship groups formed
through marriage).
139 B. FARBER, supra note 129, at 11.
140 Id.
141 C. LEvI-STRAuss, supra note 135, at 50-5 1.
142 Unlike the general case in which individual responsibility was transfered to one's
family, see supra note 124, the wrongdoer in this particular instance was held individually
responsible.
143 A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 20.
144 Id.
145 See supra note 95.
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to the fundamental institutions of the culture, 146 can be seen operat-
ing at the intersection of these societies' marriage rules and their
treatment of incest. 47 To the extent that incest, which violated
both the marriage rules and the principle of reciprocity, threw into
question the institutional means employed by the tribal community
for the purpose of drawing boundaries, it is logical to speak of it as a
threat to the "very existence of society itself. "
48
Further, the treatment of a wrongdoer who had committed in-
cest itself can be seen as an institutional device involved in the crea-
tion of social cohesion. By violating the very rules through which
families were perpetuated, the incest offender lost the "right" to
have responsibility for his or her conduct absorbed by his or her
kin. 149 Once stripped of a kinship identification, the offender ceased
to be cognizable in the boundary-defining process and therefore was
transformed into an object outside of the community.' 50 In a sense,
the "exterritorialized" wrongdoer became distinguishable from the
rest of the community solely because he or she no longer had links
to the tribe through a family group.
The incest prohibition, moreover, was figured by reference to
the offender's prior status as part of a particular clan.' 5 1 Therefore,
the deliberations necessarily focused on the fact of kinship affiliation
itself. The imposition of punishment made all observers aware of
the existence of a stark contrast between the relational ties which
remained in place linking together those men and women who had
constructed "appropriate" marital relationships and the absence of
such a link on the wrongdoer's part. The convocation of the com-
munity for the purpose of revoking the offender's tribal member-
ship was not simply an unfortunate event triggered by a failure of
the society's institutional machinery. Rather, it was an important
146 See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
147 "[I]n the rules of marriage, or at least the rule prescribing with whom it may or
may not take place, we have reached a vague begining of law." A.S. DIAMOND, supra note
64, at 26.
148 See supra text accompanying note 113.
149 This result is accurate by definition because the wrongdoer was punished as an
individual rather than as a member of an offending clan. See supra note 143.
150 Upon the commission of this offense, the wrongdoer generally was subject to a
form of excommunication in which he or she was transformed into an object beyond the
margins of the community. Once the offender had been "exterritorialized," he or she
was viewed as a wild animal to be hunted and killed. Cf. Bittner & Platt, The Meaning of
Punishment, 2 IssuEs IN CRIMINOLOGy 79, 82 (1966) (arguing, on the other hand, that this
treatment of tribal offenders was not "punishment" because it was not "redemptive").
151 One must be a member of a family in order to establish an incestuous relationship
with another member of the same family. In a sense, therefore, prior membership in a
given family was one of the requisite elements of this offense.
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collective ritual essential in the life of the community as a means by
which tribespeople were taught about the centrality of their own
family affiliations and about the role those affiliations played in
binding together the whole group.
152
B. FROM TRIBAL SOCIETY TO CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
The short list of behaviors treated as public offenses by the tri-
bal cultures of the food gathering and initial agricultural stages 53
stands as evidence that the problem of maintaining collective cohe-
sion was not considerable. It has been suggested that a high level of
social control was inherent in these societies because a similarity of
background and experience led community members to develop
rather consistent mental pictures of the relatively simple world in
which they lived. 1
54
Emile Durkheim has described the social cohesion characteristic
of tribal societies as "mechanical solidarity."' 55 This phrase is
meant to suggest an analogy to simple living organisms constructed
of functionally equivalent and homogeneous parts.' 56 As more
complex forms of production developed, however, individuals and
groups within the collective became increasingly differentiated on
the basis of their daily labor.' 57 Along with expansion in the divi-
sion of labor came expansion in the range of contacts between pre-
viously isolated social groups. 158 Larger economic systems were
created in which different groups of people with different back-
152 Cf. K. ERICKSON, supra note 45, at 13 (deviant behavior is not "a simple kind of
leakage which occurs when the machinery of society is in poor working order;" rather it
is "an important condition for preserving the stability of social life" necessary to "[mark]
the outer edges of group life").
153 See supra notes 95-96.
154 "Internal control is especially effective in a homogeneous society characterized by
consensus as to norms of conduct. Where conflicting groups indoctrinate the young
with conflicting conceptions of acceptable and desirable behavior-and even thinking-
external controls become more and more necessary." Roucek, supra note 44, at 12.
155 E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SociETY 256-82 (G. Simpson trans.
1960).
156 Giddens, Introduction to E. DURKHEIM, SELECTED WRITINGS at 6 (A. Giddens ed. &
trans. 1972).
157 Id. at 8.
Diamond reports, for example, that among the "pastoral peoples" of the Cattle-
Keeping stage, the herding of cattle was confined to males. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note
64, at 88. In addition, when the community was forced to move to a new area, the men
cut down the trees and burnt the timber while the women and children leveled and tilled
the ground. Id. at 9 1. In some of these societies, a further division of labor was recog-
nized between free men and women on the one hand and serfs on the other. Id.
158 E. DURKHEIM, supra note 125, at 150-54 (translation of excerpt from E. DURKHEIM,
THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1960)).
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grounds and world views engaged in different occupational tasks. 159
Inevitably, the collective ceased to be defined by the consistency
with which each member's experiential package coincided.
1 60
Mechanical solidarity gradually gave way to what Durkheim labelled
"organic solidarity."' 161 Social cohesion soon was based upon "ties
of co-operation between individuals or groups of individuals which
derive[d] from their occupational interdependence within the differ-
entiated division of labour."'
62
The development of this heightened individuation,163 in turn,
was coupled with a transformation in the norms and values of or-
ganic society. While tribal peoples had embraced a normative sys-
tem which emphasized the autonomy of the clan and the importance
of the collective, 164 later societies, organized according to the prin-
159 Giddens, Introduction to E. DURKHEIM, SELECTED WRITINGS, at 8 (A. Giddens ed. &
trans. 1972). In addition to an expanding division of labor, Durkheim identified popula-
tion concentration, improved transportation and improved communication as other fac-
tors in the decline of mechanical solidarity. E. DURKHEIM, supra note 155, at 257-60.
160 Above all, the multiplicity of ways of thinking cannot become a problem in periods
when social stability underlies and guarantees the internal unity of a world view. As long
as the same meanings of words and the same ways of deducting ideas inculcated from
childhood are present in every member of the group, divergent thought-processes can-
not exist in that society. K. MANNHEIM, supra note 42, at 6.
161 Organic communities "are formed, not by the repetition of similar, homogeneous
segments, but by a system of different organs each of which has a special role, and which
are themselves formed of differentiated parts." E. DURKHEIM, supra note 125, at 143.
162 Giddens, Introduction to E. DURKHEIM, SELECTED WRITINGS, at 8 (A. Giddens ed. &
trans. 1972). "In this type, individuals are no longer grouped according to their rela-
tions of lineage, but according to the particular nature of the social activity to which they
devote themselves." E. DURKHEIM, supra note 125, at 143.
163 The transformation ofsocieties founded upon group-based consciousness into so-
cieties oriented toward the interdependence of autonomous individuals has been de-
scribed in some significant detail by Durkheim. E. DURKHEIM, supra note 155, at 256-82.
According to his formulation, the collective conscience of any society consists of four
component parts. The first, which has been termed the "volume of the conscience col-
lective," concerns the degree to which the knowledge and thought of individuals coin-
cide. Giddens, Introduction to E. DURKHEIM, SELECTED WRITINGS, at 5 (A. Giddens ed. &
trans. 1972). The second element pertains to the "intensity" with which those common
ideas are held by members of the community. Id. The third, "rigidity," refers to the
extent to which collective rules of daily conduct are subject to individual interpretation.
Id. Finally, Durkheim argues, the hold of the community over the individual can be
measured by the "content" of social life or the norms and values of the collective. Id.
Employing these concepts, Durkheim explained that an expanding division of labor
and an expanding economic interdependence caused a decline in the volume, intensity
and rigidity or the collective conscience of organic society. Id. at 6. The resulting
growth in "individuation" meant that community members were increasingly able to
develop distinct personalities and exercise independent judgement in their dealings with
one another and with the material conditions of the world in which they lived. E. DURK-
HEIM, supra note 155, at 223-350.
164 In Durkheim's view, the content of tribal society was located in its celebration of
the power of the community. These cultures embraced this "religion" and its associated
rituals in order to give expression to the sacred power of the collective viewed exter-
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ciples of organic solidarity, developed new moral 165 ideals which
stressed the worth and dignity of autonomous individuals.' 66 The
moral content of the earlier mechanical society had been a sort of
religion of the whole.' 67 Durkheim called the new moral focus of
organic society the "cult of the individual."'
t 68
A fundamental point in Durkheim's description was that "moral
individualism" or the cult of the individual is itself a collective prod-
uct. 16 9 He clearly asserted that collective cohesion at any level of
social and economic development depends upon the existence of a
"certain intellectual and moral community."' 170 In tribal societies,
this moral community consisted of a "system of collective beliefs
and practices" directed toward the "special authority" and "moral
supremacy" of the group. 17 In later cultures, the moral community
expressed itself in a religion of the individual: a system of collective
beliefs and practices directed toward endowing each community
member with a free will' 7 2 and an independent moral status.
173
Societies characterized by a high degree of individuation are as
much in need of a system of collective beliefs and practices encour-
nally, just as they engaged in the practice of marriage and the associated conventions of
exogamy and matrilocality in order to define the internal organization of the commu-
nity. For a discussion of Durkheim's view of tribal religion, see Giddens, supra note 156,
at 20-25. See generally E. DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE
(1961).
165 The term "moral" as used by Durkheim and as used herein does not have the
meaning of "voluntary compliance with ethical standards." Pope, Classic on Classic: Par-
sons' Interpretation of Durkheim, 38 AM. Soc. REv. 399, 407 (1973). Rather, for Durkheim,
"moral" simply meant that which is imbued with the power and authority of the collec-
tive. Id. Therefore, to act morally means to "act in terms of the collective interest." Id.
166 E. DURKHEIM, supra note 155, at 172, 400, 407; E. DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 240, 334,
336 (J. Spaulding & G. Simpson trans. 1951). See also L. VOIGT & W. THORNTON, THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 44-5 1; R. Pound, supra note 41, at 13-14.
167 But cf. A.S. DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 81 (religion, defined as "belief in and a
regardful attitude towards a supernatural being on whom man feels himself dependent
and to whose will he makes an appeal in his worship," did not appear until the Third
Agricultural Grade).
168 E. DURKHEIM, supra note 155, at 400, 407.
169 This is not to say, however, that [with the decline of mechanical solidarity] the
conscience collective is likely to disappear completely. Rather it increasingly comes
to consist of very general and indeterminate ways of thought and sentiment, which
leaves room open for a growing variety of individual differences. There is even a
place where it is strengthened and made precise: this is, in the way in which it
regards the individual. As all the other beliefs and all the other practices take on a
less and less religious character, the individual becomes the object of a sort of
religion.
E. DURKHEIM, supra note 125, at 145-46.
170 Lukes, Durkheim's "Individualism and the Intellectuals", 17 POL. STUD. 25 (1969)(trans-
lation of Durkheim, Individualism and the Intellectuals).
171 Id.
172 For a discussion of Durkheim's view of free will as a component of moral individu-
alism, see Pope, supra note 165, at 406-08.
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aging social cohesion as are societies of low individuation. 174 In
both instances, the collective's boundaries must be marked by a pro-
cess of inclusion and exclusion occurring at the highest level of as-
sociation at which a perception of common purpose can be
created. 175 In tribal societies, boundary-defining had taken place at
the level of the kinship group. 176 This result was made possible by
the existence of two conditions: the powerful identification each in-
dividual felt with his or her family and the similarity of one clan to
another within a tribe. 177 With the transformation of homogeneous
tribal societies into highly differentiated organic societies, however,
neither condition could be met by the kinship group.
173 For if it is true that religion is, in a sense indispensable, it is no less certain that
religions change, that yesterday's religion could not be that of tomorrow. Thus
what we need to know is what the religion of today should be.
Now, all the evidence points to the conclusion that the only possible candidate
is precisely this religion of humanity whose rational expression is the individualist
morality .... [A]s a consequence of a more advanced division of labor, each mind
finds itself directed toward a different point of the horizon, reflects a different as-
pect of the world and, as a result, the contents of men's minds differ from one
subject to another .... This is why man has become a god for man and is why he
can no longer turn to other gods without being untrue to himself.
Lukes, supra note 170, at 25-26.
174 In order to clarify this point, it is necessary to reinforce the distinction drawn ear-
lier between the level of individuation in a community, and the nature of the content of
its collective conscience. See supra note 163. The former refers to the actual relationship
of the members of the community to the material conditions of their world-as mea-
sured by the volume, intensity and rigidity of the collective conscience-while the latter
refers to the way in which people believe they relate to their community and the larger
world around them. While the distinction is of critical importance at the level of theory,
the content of the collective conscience-whatever it may be-functions in practice to
mediate the relationship between people at any given level of individuation, on the one
hand, and the real and material conditions of their world, on the other. Taken together,
this whole process of "being" constitutes the ideology of a society. See supra notes 45-49
and accompanying text.
The transformation of the content of the collective conscience from a celebration of
the divinity of the collective to a celebration of the divinity of the individual should,
therefore, be understood as an adjustment of the ideological institutions in developing
society in order to accomodate increasingly individuated community members in an in-
creasingly complex economic and cultural envrionment. Id.
175 The conditions of membership in the community must be set forth for those social
actors understood to be responsible for their conduct. See supra notes 121-23 and ac-
companying text.
176 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
177 This organization, just like the horde, of which it is only an extension, evidently
carries with it no other solidarity than that derived from resemblance, since the
society is formed of similar segments and these in their turn enclose only homoge-
neous elements. No doubt, each clan has its own character and is thereby distin-
guished from others; but the solidarity is proportionally weaker as they are more
eterogeneous, and vice versa. For segmental organization to be possible, the seg-
ments must resemble one another: without this, they would not be united. And
they must differ; without this, they would lose themselves in each other and be
effaced.
E. DURKHEIM, supra note 125, at 142-43.
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With respect to the first condition, individuals living in organic
societies increasingly came to identify with and participate in a
number of different groups at a variety of different points in the so-
cial structure.178 Even though each person's world-view was still
governed by his or her participation in social groups, 179 the relative
diversity of association, together with the extensive interpenetration
of one group into another, resulted in a social fabric capable of defi-
nition only at the level of the individual.180 Each community mem-
ber's "web of group affiliation"' 18 ' effectively "circumscribed" him
or her as a unique individual because of the improbability that other
persons would "exhibit the same combination of group
affiliations." 8
2
With respect to the second condition, the various associations
in place within organic societies, including familial, occupational
and territorial groups, were no longer adequate constituent units
upon which to build a collective, even if individuals had been able to
form synecdochic identifications with a single group. This was due
to a progressive differentiation of groups along both horizontal and
vertical axes.' 8 3 The horizontal differentiation involved the ex-
panding division of labor described by Durkheim. 8 4 Equally impor-
tant was the existence of a vertical differentiation represented by an
increasing diversity of social status and material wealth from one
class of individuals to another within the community.'
85
The efferent force of this heterogeneity, at the level of the indi-
178 G. SIMMEL, CONFLICT AND THE WEB OF GROUP AFFILIATION 140-41 (1955).
179 Even in fragmented contemporary society, primary groups, including families, re-
main as institutions of social control. Unlike tribal societies, however, where primary
groups were able to accomplish the bulk of boundary maintaining work, contemporary
societies must parcel out problems of social control to a variety of less intimate secon-
dary groups to which members of the community hold individual rather than collective
ties. Roucek, supra note 44, at 11-12. Cf. C.H. COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS: A
STUDY OF THE LARGER MIND 23-31 (1913) (individuals come to understand their individu-
ality through "face-to-face" interactions within primary groups).
180 Imagine a three-dimensional model of a community in which individuals are repre-
sented by points and groups by lines connecting those points. In organic society, a
single point typically would be connected to many other points by lines running up and
down, side to side, front to back and so on. Any attempt to define the boundaries of
such a community at the level of groups necessarily would fail, because the groups' lines,
by definition, would be two-dimensional. In order to capture the true contours of the
community, therefore, one would have to describe the model in terms of individual
points, thereby indicating the height, width and depth of the whole.
181 G. SIMMEL, supra note 178, at 140-41.
182 Janowitz, The Intellectual History of "Social Control", in SOCIAL CONTROL FOR THE
1980s 28 (J.S. Roucek ed. 1978).
183 See generally E. ZIEGENHAGEN, supra note 58, at 24-29.
184 E. DURKHEIM, supra note 155, at 86.
185 E. ZIEGENHAGEN, supra note 58, at 27-29.
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vidual and at the level of the group, ultimately became inconsistent
with the group-based consciousness upon which social cohesion had
depended in tribal communities. 186 Although individuals were still
subject to a life-long series of socializing experiences prepared for
them in the context of group participation, the growing divergence
in material conditions from group to group, along with the fact that
individuals now participated simultaneously in a number of different
associations, meant that a new level of boundary-defining had to be
invented. As a consequence, the ideology of the group had to be
replaced by the alternative, though imaginary, 187 perception that
each member of the community stood as an autonomous individ-
ual.188 The relationship of the members of the collective to the
whole had to be reconstructed so that each person came to under-
186 See supra text accompanying notes 124-27. But see Nader & Combs-Schilling, supra
note 53, at 36 (asserting that clan societies are not automatically associated with collec-
tive responsibility).
187 In regard to the characterization of this perception as "imaginary," it has been
observed that both group consciousness and individual autonomy must be "learned or
invented," given the "erosion of biologically preprogrammed behavior" in humans.
Roucek, Introduction to SOCIAL CONTROL FOR THE 1980s ix. (I.S. Roucek ed. 1978). A
number of writers have, however, identified the dangers inherent in the fictive nature of
the ideology of individuality. Barrington Moore, Jr., for example, has provided a chil-
ling description of a hypothesized society in which the influence of collective social prac-
tice has been completely obscured by a technologically reinforced ideology of the
individual. He writes:
What would be the chief characteristics of such a society? Its most striking
feature would be a change in the definition and dimensions of human autonomy
and freedom. The citizen in such a state would believe that he [or she] was 'sponta-
neously' and 'freely' making the 'right' decisions in all aspect of his [or her) life. But
in reality both governed and governers would be caught in the same silken web of
oversimplified alternatives, the 'best' of which would be equally discernable to eve-
ryone, pounded home by efficient mass communications. In such a society all the
members could be depended upon to repress each other in nonviolent ways so suc-
cessfully that the central government could reduce its political functions substan-
tially in favor of administrative maintainence of the new 'best of all possible worlds.'
Crude police terror would be unnecessary. 'Free elections' could continue since
they would not constitute a threat to the established system.
B. MOORE, JR., POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY 86 (1958).
A more benign treatment of the same idea has been undertaken by Tomotsu
Shibutani. He has pointed out that the social practice common in contemporary western
society of leaving "tips" represents an everyday working out of the ideology of individu-
ality. Without identifying anything sinister in the practice, Shibutani calls to our atten-
tion the conflict between our perception of the leaving of a tip as a voluntary act which
we are free to do or not do as we please with the reality that failure to leave a "gratuity"
under circumstances in which it is called for is considered a grave breach of social con-
vention. Leaving a tip, in other words, while a behavior we all understand as the prod-
uct of individual volition, is in fact a social practice determined by intense and
collectively created social pressure. T. SHIBUTANI, SOCIETY AND PERSONALITY 281-82
(1961).




stand him or her self not principally as a member of a kinship
group-where each of the various families had served as their mem-
bers' agents in the process of boundary defining' 89-but as a dis-
tinct individual with a separate consciousness, a free will, and an
independent relationship to the whole.190
In fact, it was only at the level of the individual that a sense of
commonality could be located. The only common denominator to
be found in organic society was the individual community mem-
ber.191 Certainly, each person brought to the collective a distinctive
set of experiences and a unique pattern of group participation. This
represents the high individuation about which Durkheim had writ-
ten.192 In addition, however, each individual brought a shared be-
lief in his or her own volitional autonomy and a faith in the
autonomy of all other members of the collective.' 93 The strength of
the collective conscience in organic society was bound up in a pro-
gressive recognition of the individual as free agent. Each commu-
nity member's sense of self-actualization rendered him or her
similar to every other community member, and it was this shared
subjective understanding of individual personality which rendered
them all appropriate constituent units upon which to build the
189 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
190 The most important consequence of this perception is that individuals are pre-
sumed to have the capacity to choose from among alternative courses of conduct and,
therefore, may be held individually responsible for their choices. See infra notes 210-13
and accompanying text. Herbert Morris has made this point explicitly in the course of
arguing that a retributive system of punishment is to be preferred over other models of
sanctioning because the former respects the "fundamental right" of each individual to
be "treat[ed] ... as a person." Morris, Persons and Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISH-
MENT 90 (S. Grupp ed. 1971). The first step of Morris's argument consists of the asser-
tion that an "individual" is a "person" precisely because of his or her capacity to engage
in rational choice. Next, Morris explains that retributive punishment is not imposed
upon an individual unless that person has engaged in an act which diverges from a set-
tled communal "norm." Finally, Morris concludes that, because the offender's counter-
normative conduct is, by definition, the product of his or her own free choice, it is that
individual who must assume "responsibility" for the punishment which ensues, since it
is his or her choice which has "caused" the resulting sanction. Id. at 90-102.
191 "One is thus gradually proceeding towards a state of affairs, now almost attained,
in which the members of a single social group will no longer have anything in common
other than their humanity, that is, the characteristics which constitute the human person
in general... " Lukes, supra note 170, at 26.
192 See supra note 163.
193 "[So each individual mind has within it something of the divine, and thereby finds
itself marked by a characteristic which renders it sacred and inviolable to others." E.
DURKHEIM, supra note 125, at 23. See also 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw, supra note 88, at 53 (the laws of Henry I focused on the individual culpability of the
offender due to the influence of Christianity and its emphasis on individualism as op-
posed to the "solidarity and joint responsibility of the kindred").
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collective.194
194 Rudolf Stammler has described the function of law-civil and criminal-as the rec-
ognition of a community of autonomous people each exercising individual volition. R.
STAMMLER, THE THEORY OF JUSTICE (Husik trans. 1925). Schafer has drawn the causal
arrow in the other direction. See Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional
Aim Modernized, 50 MINN. L. REV. 243, 245-46 (1965).
The individualistic concept of crime was a product of the eighteenth cen-
tury.... In the individualistic era man demanded the right to pursue his own ends,
to act independently, and to have his individuality respected by all. Criminal jus-
tice, in compliance with this call, viewed the criminal act isolated from social
problems.
Id.
The French Marxist, Louis Althusser, in his work on the role of the Enlightenment
philosophy of humanism in post-feudal capitalist society, has directed his attention to
this point. Humanism, while "celebrat[ing] the autonomy and choice of the free individ-
ual ... forgets that men [and women] only exist in the moulds prepared for them by the
history of social relations." C. SUMNER, READING IDEOLOGIES: AN INVESTIGATION INTO
THE MARXIST THEORY OF IDEOLOGY AND LAW 26 (1979) (summarizing Althusser's theory).
In addition, Althusser has asserted that the ideology of individuality has been used by
liberal society and liberal political theorists to mask "true" class consciousness of peo-
ples living under capitalism and, by extension, to mask the fact of domination by some
classes over others. L. ALTHUSSER, MONTESQUIEU, ROUSSEAU, MARX: POLrICS AND His-
TORY 151-54 (1982).
The difficulty with this theory is that, as an analysis based solely upon class, it neces-
sarily fails to capture the full range of associations which define a person's place in soci-
ety. In fact, it is the complexity and discordance of these several associations which
account for the heterogeneity of organic society and which render groups of individuals
inappropriate primary units upon whcih to build a collective. See supra notes 178-86 and
accompanying text.
The responding Marxist analysis would likely assert that individuals' patterns of
group participation tend to occur in clusters (i.e., minority group affiliation tends to
correspond to poor education which tends to correspond to poverty and so forth). This
analysis might further suggest that such clusters represent the basis for a class con-
sciousness. See, e.g., C. SUMNER, supra at 190. In fact, there is substantial evidence to
support these views. For example, although the criminal justice system in the United
States claims to evaluate the conduct of autonomous individuals, the people who are
processed through that system, see generally M. FREELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT
(1979), and who are sanctioned by it, see, e.g., Spohn, Gruhl & Welch, The Effect of Race on
Sentencing: "A Re-Examination of an Unsettled Question," 16 L. & Soc. REV. 71, 85 (1981-82),
are disproportionately drawn from groups of racial minorities and the poor. As Nader
and Combs-Schilling put it:
We are a country where everybody, we say, is equal before the law. Yet our jails are
full of the poor and downtrodden. It is clear from the evidence at hand that there
are at least two legal systems operating in the United States-one for the upper-
income groups and the other for lower-income groups. The model may be one of
internal colonialism.
Nader & Combs-Schilling, supra note 53, at 40.
Although this view is compelling, it need not necessarily stand as a critique of the
criminal process or of the ideology of individuality. The criminal process, as an institu-
tion bound up with the ideology of individuality, see infra 195-257 and acompanying text,
operates to create a sense of common purpose by obscuring the forces which differenti-
ate groups in the community and by reinforcing a notion of shared autonomous individ-
uality. Id. At present, this project of obscuration masks the fundamental structural
inequities which exist in contemprary western society. The fact remains, however, that
even if there were a more equitable distribution of resources and opportunity, a consid-
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C. CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL LAW AND THE
IDEOLOGY OF INDIVIDUALITY
A number of commentators have attempted to identify a ritual-
istic or ceremonial aspect in the operation of contemporary criminal
law.195 Some authors such as Andenaes and Hawkins have theo-
rized that public punishment in any of its familiar forms serves to
express social disapproval and reprobation.' 96 According to this
theory, the "educative-moralizing"' 97 function of punishment in-
ures not from the imposition of any particular sanction but rather
from the intrinsically stigmatizing nature of sanctioning in gen-
eral. 198 Punishment, in the words of one writer, is a "ritualistic de-
vice" meant to convey "moral condemnation."' 99
Other students of the institutional model of criminal law have
stressed that the public impact of a prosecution is achieved not
merely through the process of imposing punishment but also
through the "dramatization of evil" which is said to occur at the
adjudication phase of a criminal trial.200 Taken together, the ritual
by which culpability is determined and the ritual by which punish-
ment is imposed constitute a public "degradation ceremony.''201
Such ceremonies, some argue, assist in "reinforc[ing] group solidar-
ity" 20 2 and help to "bind persons to the collectivity" 203 by stimulat-
ing a "socialization" process through which the authority of
erable heterogenity would still exist. Contemporary society is comprised of individuals
whose high levels of individuation lead them naturally to question their place in the
collective. Even in the absence of class, race and gender inequity, the criminal justice
system would and should continue to function to obscure the many ways in which peo-
ple would continue to be dissimilar. In these terms, the ideology of individuality is an
essential element in the process of maintaining social cohesion. It creates a community
of individuals who share a false but common faith in each other's autonomy. It is this
shared understanding, more than anything else, which encourages cooperation and gen-
eral compliance with the most basic communal rules of conduct. Id. But see SCHEINGOLD,
THE PoLrrcs OF LAW AND ORDER (1984)(describing a "politicization" of the criminal
justice system caused by conflicts over interests and, especially, value).
195 F. TANNENBAUM, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY 19 (1938); Garfinkel, Conditions of Suc-
cessful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. Soc. 420 (1956); Hawkins, Punishment and Deter-
rence: The Educative, Moralizing and Habituative Effects, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 550.
196 Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 PA. L. REV. 949, 950
(1966); Hawkins, supra note 195, at 555.
197 P. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 247 (1960); Hawkins, supra note 195,
at 553-60.
198 Hawkins, supra note 195, at 553-60.
199 Id.
200 F. TANNENBAUM, supra note 195, at 19.
201 Garfinkel, supra note 195, at 421-23.
202 Id. at 421.
203 Id.
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normative rules are "internalized. '20 4
This picture of the institutional functioning of contemporary
criminal law is incomplete for two reasons. First, it fails to account
for the created relationship between actor and act which is an essen-
tial component of boundary-defining in any society.20 5 Second, it
fails to account for the requirement of mens rea, one of the most
important doctrinal features of the common law of crimes. 206 To
the extent that any system of sanctioning public wrongs serves to
assist a community in boundary-defining, community members
looking to the morality play of adjudication and punishment must
share some understanding of how responsibility for behavior is
ascribed. Among tribal peoples this shared understanding con-
sisted of an ideology of the group in which responsibility for con-
duct was thought to belong to an offending family. In fact, a
primary task of the process of identifying and sanctioning "crimi-
nal" offenders in tribal society was to reinforce the clan-based sense
of responsibility upon which communal integrity depended. 20 7 Sim-
ilarly, criminal law in contemporary society is an essential boundary-
maintaining device not simply because of its capacity to articulate
the particular rules of the community, but also, and perhaps more
importantly, because of its role in affirming an ideology which views
each individual as responsible for his or her own conduct.
An examination of the relationship between the ideology of in-
dividuality and modem criminal law doctrine lends support to this
description. It is settled law that an offender is not culpable for be-
havior nominally in violation of a criminal statute unless his or her
act was "voluntary," which is to say, a product of his or her autono-
mous free will. 20 In the familiar language of the criminal law,
wrongful conduct, although a necessary condition for a finding of
criminal responsibility, is not sufficient unless it was voluntary and
accompanied by mens rea or evil intent.
20 9
204 Hawkins, supra note 195, at 557-60 (criminal law has a "socializing" rather than a
"moralizing" impact because it encourages acceptance of the authority, rather than the
morality, of communal rules).
205 See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
206 See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
208 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 26, at 776.
209 Although there has long been a considerable confusion of terminology with re-
spect to the requirements of volition and intention, see, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAw 395 (1978), western jurisprudence has been relatively consistent in its
insistence that criminal responsibility be premised upon conduct which is the product of
an offender's "free will." See, e.g., 2J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENG-
LAND 99, 183 (1883). Despite this general statement of principle, it is clear that contem-
porary criminal law does not require an affirmative showing of volition in all cases.
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Theorists influenced by the "classical" or "liberal" school of
criminology210 have attempted to provide an explanation for the
existence of the requirements of volition and mens rea by arguing
that these doctrinal features have been generated by an underlying
morality which holds that individuals are "being[s] endowed with
reason and able, within limits, to choose one of various possible
courses of conduct." 21 1 Jerome Hall has explained that the imposi-
tion of punishment upon an offender is justified only when, and only
because of, an offender's individual choice to engage in proscribed
conduct.2 12 As Hall writes, the criminal law "rests precisely upon
the same foundations as does our traditional ethics: human beings
are 'responsible' for their volitional conduct."
2 13
To claim that contemporary criminal law and Western ethics
rest upon the same cultural foundations, however, does not neces-
Rather, the doctrine generally assumes that an act has been voluntarily committed and
then recognizes an obligation on the part of courts to allow defendants an opportunity
to overcome the presumption through the presentation of evidence indicating a lack of
volition. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1), (2) (1962)(volition presumed unless the
act was "reflex or convulsion," "bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep,"
"conduct during hypnosis," or bodily movement otherwise "not a product of the effort
or determination of the actor").
With repsect to the requirement of mens rea, there generally has been greater insis-
tence that affirmative proof of intention be presented during the course of a criminal
prosecution, and most statutory offenses now specify some mental state as a requisite
component for a finding of culpability. See generally Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REV.
974, 975-1016 (1932)(tracing the development of the mens rea concept in relation to
changing objectives of the criminal law through history). In fact, the Model Penal Code
provides that an offender is not guilty of an offense unless he or she can be shown to
have acted "purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently . . . with respect to each
material element of the offense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1962).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that certain "regulatory offenses"
may be enforced without a showing of intention on the part of the offender. United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922);
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910). However, the Court has been
willing to allow strict liability because the offender was deemed capable of avoiding the
offense "with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion
than it might reasonably exact from one who has assumed his responsibility." Moris-
sette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952). See generally Wasserstrom, Strict Liability
in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1959-60).
210 N. KIrRIE, THE RIGi-r TO BE DIFFERENT 20-21 (1971).
During the eighteenth century's Enlightenment, or Age of Reason, new theories
about the relationship of man [and woman] to society were articulated .... [I]t was
Cesare di Beccaria who promulgated the first comprehensive theory of criminal jus-
tice founded upon the principles of human dignity .... In 1764, his work, On
Crimes and Punishments, became the lodestone of what is now considered the lib-
eral or classical school of criminology.
Id.
211 Hall, supra note 26, at 775.
212 See, e.g., J. HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 166-67 (1947).
213 Hall, supra note 25, at 776.
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sarily lead to the conclusion that the requirements of volition and
mens rea, which are central features of the former, owe their exist-
ence to an individualistic morality, which is the central feature of the
latter. To the extent that Hall's explanation posits as fact the exist-
ence of autonomous individuals exercising free choice, his theory is
undermined by considerable evidence suggesting that human be-
havior is the product of a "complex of causal factors ... which com-
bine to produce a certain resultant in a given individual." 214 On the
other hand, if the view is that the moral voice of the community
demands proof of mens rea and volition as a prerequisite to the im-
position of punishment because of a collectively held, although not
necessarily factually based, belief in the concept of free will,21 5 the
theory is also inadequate. Such a view fails to account for the possi-
bility that society's construction of such a subjective belief occurs, at
least in part, through the operation of the criminal law itself.
Durkheim's theory of mechanical and organic solidarity216 is es-
pecially helpful in solving this dilemma, because it avoids the "se-
mantic confusion" inherent in viewing determinism and free choice
as mutually exclusive alternatives.21 7 Durkheim went beyond the
simple assertion that behavior is determined by environment and
experience in arguing that it is the degree to which individual con-
214 Knight, Detenminism, "Freedom, "and Psychotherapy, 9 PSYCH. 251, 255 (1946).
215 Herbert Packer has expressed this concept as follows:
The idea of free will in relation to conduct is not, in the legal system, a statement of
fact, but rather a value preference having very little to do with the metaphysics of
determinism and free will .... mhe law treats man's [and woman's] conduct as
autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed as if
it were.
H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74 (1968). Similarly,Justice Cardozo
wrote that the criminal law "assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in
the solution of its problems." Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
216 See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
217 Knight, supra note 214, at 251.
To claim that Durkheim's theory is helpful in understanding the relationship be-
tween determinism and free choice is not to adopt his views concerning the sociology of
crimes and criminal law. Durkheim argued that the evolution of societies from mechani-
cal to organic solidarity could be measured by a parallel evolution in their legal institu-
tions from the use of "repressive" to "restitutive" sanctions. E. DURKHEIM, supra note
155, at 68-69. In fact, this thesis is fraught with a number of conceptual and empirical
weaknesses and is not part of the analysis presented here. For a cogent criticism of
Durkheim's theory of law, see Hunt, Emile Durkheim: Towards a Sociology of Law, in MARx-
ISM AND LAW 27 (1982). Gillian Rose has explained that "Durkheim's thesis of the tran-
sition from repressive to restitutive penal law serves to open up the larger question of
social cohesion in a society which is based at the same time on contractual and on coop-
erative law, on negative and on normative law, and to delineate the anatomic division of
labor which results from this antinomy of freedom and control." G. RosE, DIALECrIC OF
NIHILISM 177 (1984)(footnote omitted). It is Durkheim's theory regarding this "larger
question" which is being employed in the present discussion, not his particualr view on
penal law.
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duct in a community is caused by similar or dissimilar complexes of
deterministic factors which governs the level of individuation in that
social group.218 Moreover, he taught that the extent to which envi-
ronmental and experiential stimuli 21 9 are shared ultimately has
much to do with the nature of a collective's constructed thought sys-
tems, particularly with reference to its understanding of the social
actor-kinship group or individual-thought to exercise choice. 220
Determinism is, at root, a "theoretical construct which fits the
observed data" with respect to the actual origins of behavior.221 Its
antithesis is "indeterminism." 222 Free choice, by contrast, involves
the "subjective psychological experience" by which conduct is at-
tributed to the will of a given individual. 223 The logic of Durkheim's
view suggests that a complete picture of any community must in-
clude both a description of the way in which behavior is actually de-
termined and a description of the subjective process of attribution
by which "responsible" social actors are identified. 224
Once one accepts the notion that determinism and a subjective
belief in free choice are coexisting phenomena, it becomes possible
to identify different ways in which an individual can be said to ex-
ist.225 Viewed as an entity engaged in physical activity caused by
environmental and experiential stimuli which are more or less simi-
lar to those determining the behavior of others in the collective, the
individual can be described as a determined being.226 Viewed as an
entity subjectively thought by self and others to be generating con-
duct through free choice, the individual can be identified as an ideo-
218 See, e.g., E. DURKHEIM, supra note 166, at 325; Lukes, supra note 170, at 26.
219 Durkheim recognized that social forces "act upon men [and women] from with-
out" along with physical, chemical, biological and psychological forces. Pope, supra note
165, at 408 (quoting Durkheim).
220 E. DURKHEIM, supra note 125, at 142-44.
221 Knight, supra note 214, at 255.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 See generally E. DURKHEIM, supra note 155, at 223-350. In Durkheim's work on sui-
cide, he directly considered the relationship between "human volition" and external
causal factors. E. DURKHEIM, supra note 166, at 287. "Durkheim describes at length the
subjective states associated with various types of suicide, noting that such states may
even appear to be the cause of suicide. In reality, however, they are merely the prolon-
gations of social causes inside the individual." Pope, supra note 165, at 409.
225 For a thorough discussion of the multiple and conflicting ways in which individuals
exist as "beings," see G. ROSE, supra note 217, at 54, 56-58, 70-73.
226 The determined being is an individual whose behavior is the product of a set of
antecedent events and forces, including heredity, environment and, perhaps, chance.
See, e.g., C. ADAMS, KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIETY 149-51 (1938). The more his or her set of
antecedent events and forces mirrors the sets of events and forces determining the be-
havior of other individuals in the community, the more that determined behavior will be
like the behavior exhibited by others. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
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logical being.2 27 The question at this point is how society goes
about constructing ideological beings. The case being made here is
that society employs criminal law as one of a number of institutions
which translate actual beingness into subjective beingness. It ac-
complishes this task by creating yet a third category-juridical be-
ingness. 228 This juridical creation emerging through the process of
adjudicating criminal offenses, although shaped in part by "what is
psychophysically given," 229 ultimately is the product of a system of
"typical values" 230 which are "derived by a mental operation upon
reality." 23 1 The typical values specific to the criminal law are voli-
tion and mens rea. They define the contours ofjuridical beingness
and make possible the submersion of determined beingness into
ideological beingness.
Richard Epstein has argued that the distinctive characteristic of
criminal law is its insistence on determining guilt through a process
of comparing the behavior of an offender to some ideal standard of
conduct adopted by the community. 23 2 In fact, the process is more
adequately described as the placing of behavioral data generated by
causal factors operating upon an individual offender into precon-
ceived idealized categories such as volition and mens rea,23 3 in or-
der to produce an image of responsibility which serves the ordering
requirements of the collective. 23 4 The ritual23 5 of adjudicating crim-
227 Perhpas the classic statement of ideological beingness is the following definition
provided by Kant: "A person is the subject whose actions are susceptible to imputation
.... Accordingly moral personality is nothing but the freedom of a rational being under
moral law (whereas psychological personality is merely the capacity to be conscious of
the identity of one's self in the various conditions of one's existence)." G. RosE, supra
note 217, at 20-21 (quoting E. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OFJUSTICE 329-30 (J.
Ladd trans. 1965)).
228 Cf. Lask, Legal Philosophy, in THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH, AND
DABIN 35-37 (K. Wilk trans. 1950)(the "prelegal realities" of "the individual and the
collective" are "properly adopted by the law, which in the same sense, in the realm of
legal meanings, coins the concepts of individual and of collective personality").
229 Id. at 36.
230 Id. at 4-6.
231 Patterson, Introduction to THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH, AND
DABIN, supra note 228, at xxix.
232 Epstein, supra note 3, at 243 (unlike tort law which employs a "comparative" stan-
dard of justice in which the conduct of two parties to a lawsuit are compared against
each other, criminal law employs an "ideal" standard ofjustice in which the conduct of
an individual defendant is measured against an ideal societal standard).
233 Cf. Patterson, supra note 231, at xxix ("Since the mind can operate only by the use
of categories or types, 'typical values,' that is, types of value, are the subject matter of
legal philosophy").
234 The words volition and mens rea are "signifiers" within a linguistic system. As
such, they have no natural and proper meanings. Rather, they must be paired with "sig-
nified" objects in order to have some tangible significance. The process of adjudication
is the process of drawing connections between these categorical words and the eviden-
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inal behavior is thus the institutional process of generating a "so-
cially constructed reality" which takes "recurrent patterns of
interaction" and, through the mediating influence of the juridical
models of volition and mens rea, turns them into "typifications of
mutually understood categories of action." 23 6
For example, suppose that a person is being tried for theft in a
jurisdiction which defines that offense as "the unlawful taking of, or
exercise of unlawful control over, movable property of another with
purpose to deprive him [or her] thereof. ' 23 7 Further suppose that
the defendant in fact entered a grocery store, took possession of a
loaf of bread, and left without paying for it. Thejob of a prosecutor
in such a case would be to array available facts according to certain
familiar doctrinal categories in order to "prove the elements of the
offense." 238 She would certainly argue that the taking of the loaf,
together with the defendant's failure to pay for it, constituted suffi-
cient "act[s]" within the meaning of the statute.239 But how would
she prove that those acts were undertaken voluntarily and with the
requisite intention? Intention might be shown by evidence that the
defendant glanced around the store and waited until he was alone
before taking hold of the bread, or by evidence that he placed the
bread inside his overcoat rather than in a shopping basket.240 Voli-
tion, no doubt, would turn on evidence indicating that the defend-
ant had been conscious and uncoerced. 24 1
But what of the possibility that the defendant had been hungry
and without money to purchase the bread? What if he had taken the
tiary data generated from actual conduct. Once joined, signifier and signified-the
words and data-form "signs, and it is this product which is ideology. C. SUMNER, supra
note 194, at 20-21.
235 For a very different analysis of litigation as "ritual," see Simon, The Ideology ofAdvo-
cacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 92-99.
236 Ball, A Theory of Punishment: Restricted Reprobation and the Reparation of Social Reality,
in STRUCTURE, LAW, AND POWER: ESSAYS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 135, 141-42 (1979).
"In this way social situations are defined, and shared meaning is established. A symbolic
universe is constructed; everything is put in its 'right' place." Id. at 142.
237 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2(1) (1962).
238 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (1962).
239 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(2) (1962) defines an "act" as "a bodily movement
whether voluntary or involuntary." As explained above, see supra note 209, the Model
Penal Code formulation presumes volition and also provides specific categories of ex-
ception to this general presumption.
240 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962)(defining "purposely," "knowingly,"
"recklessly," and "negligently," with respect to various types of material elements of
offenses). If, for example, the statute required that the taking be proved with respect to
a culpability level of purpose, the prosecutor would have to proffer evidence indicating
that it was the defendant's "conscious object" to engage in that conduct. Id.
241 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01(2), 2.09 (1962)(unconsciousness over-
comes presumption of voluntary act; duress provides affirmative defense).
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loaf as a symbolic protest against the store's discriminatory employ-
ment policies or its exorbitant pricing practices? Would it make any
difference if the theft had been part of a college prank or dare?
Clearly, each of these explanations for the defendant's conduct
would be dismissed pursuant to the common law maxim that "mo-
tive," unlike intention, is irrelevant to the law of crimes. 242 The
process of adjudicating guilt does not contain an inquiry as to why a
particular person has engaged in proscribed behavior. It is satisfied
with "proof" merely that he or she chose the wrong course of con-
duct and acted in furtherance of that choice. 243
Only by way of the prior inquiry, however, is one led to con-
sider the vast range of stimuli actually producing conduct. Motive
stands as a clue that behavior is determined, and, in organic society
determined uniquely from individual to individual. The hungry
thief, like the indignant thief and the fraternity thief, is a determined
being. As such, each is differentiated on the basis of clearly dissimi-
lar environmental and experiential backgrounds, regardless of the
fact that each has engaged in superficially similar behavior.244 The
adjudicatory process renders these dissimilarities invisible while si-
multaneously generating representations of what happened which
are quite consistent. 245 Having been worked through the process,
the hungry thief, the indignant thief and the fraternity thief, all
emerge simply as thieves: ideological beings who have chosen to
steal bread and who are therefore subject to punishment.2 46 The
fixing of guilt here is an incremental step in the collective process of
boundary-defining, because it makes a statement that theft is inap-
propriate and violates the conditions of communal membership.2 47
Specifically, the process has created grist for the boundary-defining
242 G. WILLIAMS, THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME 10, 14 (1965).
243 Id.
244 Each has taken a loaf of bread under circumstances which meet the requirements
of the statute.
245 In essence, the adjudicatory process is a process of "writing history." It is the
process of constructing a "text" which provides an account of "what has happened." In
these terms, it is quite reasonable to claim that the process has rendered something
"invisible," for history writing, by definition, is a process of selection, deletion and
translation. "What makes history possible is that a sub-set of events is found .... His-
tory is therefore never history, but history-for. It is partial in the sense of being biased
even when it claims not to be." C. LEvI-STRAuSs, THE SAVAGE MIND 257-58 (1966).
246 Motive, which stands as a clue that these individuals are different, may be taken
into account in determining which punishment should be imposed. G. WILLiAMS, supra
note 242. This concern is particularly valid if the sentencing authority employs a theory
of sanctioning in which punishment is made to fit the characteristics of the offender
rather than the offense. See generally N. KrrrRIE, supra note 210, at 20-32.
247 "Each time the community moves to censure some act of deviation, then, and con-
venes a formal ceremony to deal with the responsible offender, it sharpens the authority
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mill by creating social actors who can be held "responsible" for
their "choices," whatever those choices may be.
248
The fact that the vast majority of criminal cases in the United
States are disposed of by negotiated guilty pleas 249 is not necessarily
inconsistent with the view of the criminal process being advanced
here. Whether criminal charges are adjudicated in the context of a
full-blown trial, with all its ceremonial trappings, 250 or are resolved
by the taking of a plea, the project remains one of comparing deter-
mined beings to a doctrinal representation ofjuridical beingness so
as to reflect and reinforce a notion of ideological beingness.
When a defendant tenders a guilty plea, he or she waives a
number of constitutional rights, the most important of which is the
right to put the state to its proof at trial.251 The settled standard for
a waiver of constitutional rights is that it be voluntary, knowing and
intelligent.252 Therefore, in place of the proof presenting ritual
which would occur if the defendant proceeded to trial, a more con-
densed fact-finding process takes place in which the court satisfies
itself that a sufficient basis exists to support the conclusion that the
of the violated norm and restates where the boundaries of the group are located." K.
ERICKSON, supra note 45, at 13.
248 This process of constructing autonomous individuals is important in two respects.
First, it enables individuals to be used in boundary defining rituals. Second, it creates
and reinforces a general belief in free will, a belief which itself becomes one of the nu-
merous causal factors determining behavior. See supra note 194. This second point is
especially important since "the internal, voluntary motivation of the individual to con-
form to group norms" is, in the long run, more effective than coercive social control.
Roucek, supra note 44, at 12. In the final analysis, however, these two consequences
devolve into one, since voluntary social control itself depends upon the existence of a
general perception among community members that they share some common charac-
teristics and some common social space. Cf. id. (internal control "especially effective in a
homogeneous society").
249 See generally Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652
(1981); Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its Histoy, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979). Recent
United States Bureau of Justice data indicate that approximately 90% of all felony ar-
rests which proceed to final disposition are resolved by guilty pleas. B. BOLAND, THE
PREVALENCE OF GUILTY PLEAS (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1984).
250 See generally T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935).
251 See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (guilty plea constitutes waiver
of right to trial so must be made voluntarily and with knowledge); FED. R. CRIM. P.
I I(c)(4) (court must advise defendant that pleading guilty results in waiver of right to
trial).
252 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)(waiver must be "intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"). See also Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)(record must show guilty plea entered voluntarily and with
defendant understanding); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897)(quoting 3
RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed. 18 ))(confession must be "free and voluntary" to be
admissable). But see D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972)(ques-
tion left open whether waiver by defendant required to be "knowing and intelligent"
with respect to procedural due process).
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defendant has voluntarily and knowingly "assumed responsibility"
for his or her conduct. 253 What emerges from this truncated ritual
is an ideological being not substantially different from one who is
generated by a complete adjudicatory proceeding. In both in-
stances, the deterministic basis for the defendant's conduct is con-
cealed through a process of applying "facts" to preexisting juridical
referents. In the one case, those referents are the doctrinal require-
ments of volition and mens rea; in the other, they are the require-
ments of volition and informed choice. 254 In simple terms, the
court's procedures for acceptance of a defendant's waiver of his or
her right to a trial replicates the ideological practice of the trial it-
self. The image which is represented and reproduced by these two
ceremonial practices is the same. The picture is of an autonomous
individual held responsible for his or her freely chosen conduct.
255
This project of reflecting and reinforcing the ideology of indi-
viduality also takes place through the imposition of punishment. In
tribal society, the ideology of the group was affirmed through a pro-
cess of imposing a punishment which, by its very nature, involved
the withdrawal of that which was being reinforced-group member-
ship.2 56 In contemporary society, the imposition of any sanction, by
253 See, e.g., FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(c)(4).
254 With respect to a conviction following trial, it can be said that the defendant has
been "proved" to have committed the offense voluntarily and with the requisite inten-
tion. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.12, 1.13, 2.01, 2.02 (1962). With respect to a
conviction following a guilty plea, it can be said that the defendant has voluntarily and
knowingly "acknowledged" that he or she committed the offense voluntarily and with
the requisite intention. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (d) (court must insure that the
plea is voluntary); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (f) (court must find a factual basis for the plea).
But cf. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)(court may accept guilty plea even
when defendant fails to admit guilt, so long as factual basis for plea exists). The analo-
gous relationship between formal adjudication and the taking of guilty pleas is not nec-
essarily disrupted by the recognition of an "Alford plea," because the plea must still be
made with volition and knowledge regarding the waiver of trial. The plea also must
occur in the context of a factual record supporting the allegations in the information or
indictment, at least with respect to the offense for which the defendant has "assumed
responsibility." Id. But see Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty
Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 55-58 (1975)(suggesting that many guilty pleas, although
meeting the formal standards for waiver of constitutional rights may not actually be
voluntary).
255 Garfinkel suggests that a criminal prosecution as a "degradation ceremony" ac-
complishes "communicative work between persons, whereby the public identity of an
actor is transformed into something looked on as lower in the local scheme of social
types." Garfinkel, supra note 195, at 420. In fact, the "communicative work" accom-
plished by a conviction, whether it be generated out of a formal adjudicatory process or
by the taking of a guilty plea, involves the presentation of the offender as an individual
whose status has been degraded precisely because of his or her 'decision' to engage in
proscribed conduct.
256 See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
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necessary consequence of the fact of coercion, 257 involves the with-
drawal of individual autonomy and freedom of choice.
IV. THE STATUS OF THE "RESTITUTIONARY THEORY OF JUSTICE"
The foregoing analysis presses toward the conclusion that
human society has always depended upon the criminal law as an in-
stitutional adjunct to its boundary-maintaining function. This de-
pendence served initially to reinforce an ideology of the group and
later to reinforce an ideology of individuality. This conclusion un-
dermines the theory of restitution presented by the advocates of the
"restitutionary theory of justice." Their assertion that the individ-
ual victim of a crime is the true-and, in some accounts, only-party
in interest cannot be squared with the considerable evidence re-
specting a collective interest and participation in the administration
of a law of public wrongs from the time of tribal society to the
present.2
58
257 "[P]unishment consists essentally of a loss of a portion of self-determination."
Ball, supra note 236, at 144. H.L.A. Hart has provided the following five-part definition
of "punishment":
(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant.
(ii) It must be for an offense against legal rules.
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his [or her] offense.
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender.
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal sys-
tem against which the offense is committed.
Hart, Prolegomenon To the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILrTY 4-5
(1968). Clearly, the fact that punishment involves pain or some other unpleasant conse-
quence, together with the fact that it is imposed by an authority other than the offender,
leads one to the conclusion that it is coercive. Moreover, the fact that incarceration and
probation involve the loss of liberty, while the imposition of a fine involves the loss of
property, lends further support to the assertion. There are, of course, instances in
which people "voluntarily" give up liberty and property, but these situatons are the ex-
ception rather than the rule.
258 As noted above, some tribal cultures treated witchcraft, a few other sacral offenses
and incest, as public wrongs subject to individual punishment. See supra note 96. Some
commentators have attempted to explain the tribal practice of punishing these offenses
in a manner which does not disrupt the historical account employed in the "restitution-
ary theory ofjustice." Abel and Marsh, for example, have argued that evidence of the
existence of sacral offenses and other crimes in early societies is not at odds with the
claim that all harmful conduct was treated with a restitutionary response, because these
crimes were "thought to be fraught with serious supernatural danger." C. ABEL & F.
MARSH, PUNISHMENT AND RESTITUTION 27 (1984). Punishment of the offender in such an
instance, they argue, was not really punishment at all. Rather, "punishment of these
crimes can be seen as a sort of social rehabilitation accomplished by making restitution
to the offended deity, a restitution which involves cleansing of the social (and sometimes
the god's) body and the infliction of suffering upon the offender." Id. at 28.
This rationalization, however, misses the point, because it fails to explain the role of
religion and religious ritual in tribal society. To describe these offenses as sacral wrongs
is to say that their commission implicated the community's interest in maintaining the
cult of the group. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. Upon the commission of
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Insisting that the historical/anthropological account upon
which the "restitutionary theory of justice" is based is flawed does
not amount to rejecting the use of restitution altogether. The prop-
osition that restitution is justified as furthering one or more of the
secondary aims of the system2 59 or as serving interests otherwise ex-
trinsic to the criminal law remains to be studied.2 60 In either case,
however, because the criminal justice system functions primarily as a
any of these offenses, the wrongdoer generally was subject to the sanction of exterritori-
alization. See supra note 150. The practice of punishing sacral offenses, like the practice
of punishing incest offenders, id., served as a means of defining and maintaining com-
munal boundaries. In both cases, the imposition of an individual sanction was a ritual
reinforcing the content of the collective conscience. As Bittner and Platt have
explained:
[I]n archiac societies the boundaries of morality were largely coextensive with the
boundaries of membership in the collectivity.... [A]cts of destruction of morally
exterritorialized persons can be found to accompany the normal and routine admin-
istration of justice. In the Near East, for example, licensed acts of mob violence
against persons who offended some religious taboo run parallel with normal retrib-
utive justice ....
Bittner & Platt, supra note 150, at 85-86.
In neither instance, however, was the offender thought of as an autonomous indi-
vidual, even though he or she was singled out for individual treatment. Rather, the
offender was viewed as a noxious object to be destroyed in the interests of the commu-
nity as a whole. Cf. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMPLE L.Q. 169
(1973)(discussing the "punishment" of animals and other objects that had caused injury
or death).
259 It makes sense to describe retribution, deterrence and, to a lesser extent, rehabili-
tation as secondary aims of the criminal justice system, because these familiar models of
punishment all presume the prior existence of autonomous individuals. See, e.g.,
Tushnet, Perspectives on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's "A
History of American Law", 1977 Wis. L. REv. 81, 98 (1977)(model of deterrence "rests on
a radically individualist[ic] conception of the relationship between each person and the
whole society").
260 For a discussion of the rehabilitative, deterrent and/or retributive potential of
restitutionary sentences, see Klein, supra note 3; R. Boldt, Retribution in the Criminal
Process: A Practive In Search of'Justification (1986)(unpublished manuscript).
A cursory review of the offense of conviction case law reveals that there currently
exists no general agreement with respect to the ways in which restitutionary sanctions
may or may not further correctional or penal goals. For example, three different courts
in three different states have expressed conflicting views regarding the relationship be-
tween the rehabilitative potential of restitution and the offense of conviction limitation.
The California Supreme Court stated that restitution beyond the offense of conviction
may serve to rehabilitate offenders if the offense for which restitution is ordered was
committed with the same "state of mind" as the offense of convition. People v. Rich-
ards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 622, 552 P.2d 97, 102, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537, 542 (1976). In contrast,
the Supreme Court of Washington, in State v. Elits, 94 Wash. 2d 489, 494, 717 P.2d 993,
996 (1980)(quoting State v. Stalheim, 275 Or. 683, 688, 552 P.2d 829, 831 (1976)),
maintained that the rehabilitative impact of a restitution order is "significantly diluted"
when victims other than those directly harmed by the offense of conviction are to be
repaid. Finally, a Florida appellate court held as clearly rehabilitative a restitution order
for injuries well beyond the offense of conviction. Rose v. State, 434 So. 2d 1014, 1015
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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collective institution reflecting and reinforcing an ideology of indi-
viduality, the incorporation of restitution must be accomplished
without substantially interfering with the criminal law's primary
boundary maintaining function.
261
A. ADJUDICATION AND SENTENCING AS COORDINATE STAGES OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS
With respect to the use of restitution in the criminal process in
general and "the offense of the conviction" problem in particular,
courts and commentators have mistakenly failed to perceive the
overarching institutional role of the criminal law. The tendency has
been to argue for or against expansive orders of restitution on the
basis of rehabilitative interests, retributive interests or victims' inter-
ests without an understanding that these interests often are in con-
flict with the community's interest in insuring that the criminal law
functions as an effective ideological institution. Helen Silving has
explained that
[a] rational scheme of criminal justice is not a composite of rules and
institutions, however rational each of these may seem to be in immedi-
ate context, but a comprehensive system oriented to an overall policy.
Each rule or institution must be assessed not as a detached but as a
relational phenomenon, operating in context with the total system.
For it derives its functional meaning from the extent to which it con-
tributes to the overall policy. That policy itself must be planned sys-
tematically. Systematic planning consists in advance determination
[of] what values are to be realized; where values are conflicting; what
hierarchical place is assigned to each, and if a compromise is contem-
plated, to what extent one value may be permitted to yield to another.
Each rule of criminal law or procedure, each verdict, judgment or sen-
tence, each act of execution should be a goal-directed decision rather
than a groping attempt at finding causistic justice by a method of ad
hoc compromise. 26
2
Silving's compelling plea for a systematic and principled crimi-
nal process is contained in her discussion of an issue which bears
substantially upon the problem addressed here. She also consid-
ered the question of what relationship should exist between adjudi-
cation and sentencing in the criminal law, although she focused on
261 Some commentators have argued that restitution itself has the capacity to rein-
force the ideology of individuality. See, e.g., C. ABEL & F. MARSH, supra note 258, at 85
(restitution is "respectful" of the "principle of self-determination" and is also "support-
ive of it"). To the extent that this assertion is correct, it may provide support for the use
of restitution as a criminal sanction. Even so, the use of restitution in the criminal pro-
cess must be limited so as to avoid undermining the ritualistic function of the adjudica-
tory process. See infra notes 262-86 and accompanying text.
262 Silving, "Rule of Law" in Ciminal Justice, in ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL SCIENcE 77 (G.
Mueller ed. 1961).
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the common practice of sentencing an offender, for rehabilitative
purposes, according to his or her character with little regard for his
or her offense of conviction.2 63 True to her statement that
"[s]ystematic planning consists in advance determination [of] what
values are to be realized," 264 Silving first identified respect for indi-
vidual autonomy and dignity as the ultimate value to be served by
the criminal law.2 6 5 Consistent with this statement, she argued that
retributive principles must be the primary determinants of a crimi-
nal sanction because they "emphasize... [the offender's] responsi-
bility for his [or her] freely committed illegal acts, a responsibility
expressed in liability to punishment. ' 2 6 6 In these terms, Silving
concluded that it makes little sense "to follow the ritual of adjudica-
tion for the purpose of establishing 'guilt' for a particular act, if the
end-result of such adjudication is assumption of an entirely new
standard, that of the personality of the actor." 267 Punishment, said
Silving, must be "guilt-adequate," and "[p]ursuit of other ends of
criminal law within the punitive scheme... [must be] subject to this
limitation." 268
Although Silving's argument is persuasive, embracing retribu-
tion as the single most important "limitative principle" in the crimi-
nal law, 269 she presumed the existence of autonomous individuals
whose dignity must be respected. This article, however, challenges
that presumption by suggesting that the criminal process does more
than simply recognize an ideology of individuality. Through its cer-
emonious adjudication of guilt, and through its imposition of coer-
cive sanctions, the system creates images of autonomous individuals
and represents them to the community as reality.2 70 Silving wished
to link the sentencing phase of the criminal process to the adjudica-
tory phase in order to further the capacity of the system to recognize
the dignity of autonomous individuals.2 71 Yet even if, as has been
argued here, the primary aim of the system is to construct ideologi-
cal individuals, the conclusion remains the same: adjudication and
263 Id.
264 Id. at 77.
265 Id. at 85-87, 154.
266 Id. at 104 (distinguishing between "punishment" and non-punitive "measures" in
the German "dual-track system").
267 Id. at 105 (suggesting, however, that non-punitive measures which are not "guilt-
adequate" may also be employed, but only if they are fashioned according to the "rule
of law").
268 Id. at 89.
269 Id. at 85-87.
270 See supra notes 245-57 and accompanying text.
271 Silving, supra note 262, at 86-87.
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sanctioning must be consistent if the ultimate values expressed
through the former are to be accomplished.
Viewing Silving's theory in the context of the analysis presented
here only strengthens her call for "guilt-adequate" sentencing. Re-
tributive principles are the manifest products of moral individualism
and the ideology of individuality.2 72 The fact that Silving founded
her theory on the products of contemporary ideology rather than
upon the ideology itself merely illustrates the power of modem in-
stitutions, including the criminal law, to present a constructed real-
ity as actual reality.273 Silving was correct in her identification of
moral individuality as the ultimate value treated in the criminal pro-
cess. To replace her manifest principles with the larger ideological
analysis which produced them, therefore, only deepens the
argument.
B. NEGOTIATED GUILTY PLEAS AND THE "OFFENSE OF CONVICTION"
PROBLEM
Some courts and commentators have suggested that restitution
orders for injuries beyond the scope of an "offense of conviction"
should be enforced in cases where the gap between an offender's
adjudicated guilt and his or her "actual" guilt is the result of a nego-
tiated guilty plea. 27 4 In instances where an offender has engaged in
a series of separate offenses against a number of different victims,
dismissing certain counts or accepting a more limited plea ordina-
rily will preclude restitution to certain victims. 275 Similarly, if an of-
fender has committed a number of offenses against a single victim, a
negotiated guilty plea may cause the victim to receive only partial
restitution.2 76 The competing pressures in the system are particu-
larly acute in these cases because the victim's interest in receiving a
full recovery is believed to be hampered by an adjudicatory proce-
dure which is "grounded upon expediency" rather than the of-
fender's wrongdoing.
277
272 See supra notes 212-36 and accompanying text. Retributive principles are among
the collective beliefs and practices generated by the cult of the individual or moral indi-
vidualism. They are part of the theology of the secular religion of the individual. See
supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
273 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
274 Goldstein, supra note 6, at 537-38; Note, Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note
5, at 510-11. See also People v. Gallagher, 55 Mich. App. 613, 223 N.W.2d 92, 95 (1974).
275 Note, Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note 5, at 510 n.24.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 511. Moreover, additional pressure toward exceeding the offense of convic-
tion is produced by a practice which is common in some jurisdictions: reading additional
counts or offenses into the record during a plea-taking or otherwise noting the of-
fender's acknowledgement of "responsibility" for additional injuries. Harland, supra
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Even in cases where a plea bargaining process is responsible for
diminishing the scope of an offender's adjudicated guilt, the limited
justifications for the use of restitution do not form an adequate basis
for ordering repayment beyond an offense of conviction. First, ne-
gotiated guilty pleas are not necessarily the result of an
overburdened criminal process.278 A number of writers have ar-
gued that prosecutorial reluctance to run the risks of trial rather
than administrative convenience and efficiency are to blame for the
high volume of guilty pleas reported in most American jurisdic-
tions.279 It has even been suggested that plea bargaining is itself the
cause of much delay in the system.280 Specifically, there is substan-
tial evidence to suggest that negotiated guilty pleas produce results
which are quite consistent with outcomes generated by trials.28 ' In
either instance, there may be a gap between the offender's adjudi-
cated guilt and his or her "actual" guilt. This differential, however,
is more likely due to the quality of the state's evidence, the difficulty
of proving an offense given the requirement of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and all of the other procedural protections afforded
defendants in a constitutional scheme.28 2
note 1, at 83. The offender's informal or quasi-formal admission of guilt under these
circumstances is not an adequate basis for exceeding his or her offense of conviction.
First, substantial pressure is placed upon an offender in the plea negotiation process,
and it is therefore difficult credibly to describe this type of an admission as voluntary and
knowing, particularly when no notice has been given that an informal acknowledgement
of responsibility may form the basis for sentencing. Cf. Note, Restitution in the Criminal
Process, supra note 5, at 514-21 (suggesting that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
be amended to provide for formal notice). See also Alschuler, supra note 254 (suggesting
that many guilty pleas are not voluntary). Furthermore, to the extent that the plea bar-
gaining process has already begun to undermine the integrity of the adjudicatory ritual,
it is nonsensical to debilitate the process further by allowing sanctions beyond an of-
fense of conviction. See infra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
278 See generally Alschuler, Book Review, 12 GRIM. L. BULL. (1976).
279 See, e.g., Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 60-
61 (1968)(noting the prosecutorial practice "of bargaining hardest when the case is
weakest").
280 Id. at 56.
281 Negotiated guilty pleas may also produce outcomes which are as rational as out-
comes resulting from trials. See, e.g., Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS 108, 112 (N.A.C. Standards 1973).
282 Underinclusiveness associated with the strictness of rules of criminal procedure
relative to civil rules is an avoidable consequence of the principle that the serious-
ness of criminal guilt and sanctions warrants extraordinary procedural safeguards.
Any attempt to relax procedural rules in the criminal process to address this source
of underinclusiveness will produce tension with this fundamental principle.
Note, Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note 5, at 511 n.25. Cf. Goldstein, The State
and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE LJ. 1149 (1960) (proce-
dural protections must be afforded individual defendants in the criminal process given
defendants' relative position of powerlessness as against the state). In addition, the
traditional protections associated with American criminal procedure are an essential fea-
ture of the ritual itself, because they address the construction of the notion of "judicial
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Even were we to assume that guilty pleas are produced by a
congested criminal process, the use of restitution beyond an of-
fender's offense of conviction still would not be justified. If the ad-
judicatory process is being short-circuited because of an
overburdening of the criminal courts, it is illogical to further trivial-
ize the guilt-finding ritual by assigning yet another task to an already
overtaxed institution. The primary aim of the system is to create
and reinforce an ideology of individuality, not to insure that all vic-
tims receive a full recovery. Both are important, perhaps necessary,
functions of some institution or institutions in society. It is unrea-
sonable, however, to expect the criminal justice system to do any-
thing particularly well if it is asked to do too much simultaneously.
Advocates of restitution have asserted that society owes a duty
to crime victims to see that some effective method of recovery is
available.283 Acceptance of this claim does not inexorably lead to
beingness" and insure that outcomes are meaningful to observers. See supra notes 228-
29 and accompanying text.
283 One commentator has pointed out that the resources necessary to remedy victims'
injuries must come from either the victim, the offender or the state. Lamborn, Remedies
for the Victims of Crimes, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 22, 26 (1970). The first option, absorption by
the victim, is the most common outcome in practice. Id. It is, however, rejected by
advocates of restitution because of the belief that the state holds a responsibility to see
that victims are made whole, whether by assisting them in obtaining a recovery from the
offender, or by providing compensation from some sort of public fund. Goldstein, supra
note 6; Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice System: Time for a Change, 11 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 23, 47 (Supp. 1984); Lamborn, supra; Wasik, The Place of Compensation in
the Penal System, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 599. A variety of theories have been advanced to
account for this view. The first theory argues that, because the state, as sovereign au-
thority, must monopolize the use of force, MAX WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETv
342 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954), a failure on its part to protect those citizens who have
abandoned violence from those who have not creates an obligation to provide the for-
mer group with some effective remedy. Lamborn, supra, at 46-48. But see Riss v. City of
New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860 (1968)(crime victim has no cause of action
against city for failure to protect). The imperfect monopolization of force by the state is
said to cause certain harms, and those harms must be repaired if the government is to
retain its legitimacy. Lamborn, supra, at 46-47. In addition, it is observed that the state's
monopolization of force has the effect of making victim self-help more difficult. Except
in rare situations where the offender voluntarily offers to make his or her victim whole, a
victim must resort to force in order to accomplish reparation or restitution. Because
contempory society views such violent self-help as itself constituting criminal behavior
(of course, most jurisdictions do allow the use of reasonable force in order to prevent
harm to life or property. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (West 1975)) a duty is said to
be created whereby the state must provide the victim with some alternative means of
recovering his or her losses. Lamborn, supra, at 46-47.
A final theory centers not on the sovereign's failure, but on its affirmative obligation
to look after the welfare of its citizens. Under this theory, the victim is understood to be
similar to other needy persons who are commonly aided by the state. "The social state's
responsibility in such cases is primary and not predicated upon failure on its part. The
community has an interest in protecting and maintaining certain standards of well-being
for all its citizens." Silving, supra note 25, at 252. But see Friedsam, Legislative Assistance to
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the conclusion that victim reparation must take place in the criminal
process following an adjudication of guilt. If adjudication is to
mean anything, its ceremonial integrity must be respected in the
sanctioning process. If, on the other hand, a restitutionary obliga-
tion need not depend upon an offender's formal wrongdoing, there
is no reason to require an adjudication in the first instance. 28 4 Per-
haps the solution is to divert more offenders, prior to adjudication,
into a non-criminal process designed to fix restitutionary liability.28 5
Although establishing the contours of an alternative arbitration sys-
tem is beyond the scope of this article,28 6 the idea is worth explor-
ing. Such a solution would recognize the integrity of the
adjudicatory ceremony in those cases where an offender is tried and
punished and, at the same time, would create an alternative mecha-
Victims of Crime: The Florida Crimes Compensation Act, 11 FLA. ST. L. REv. 859, 864-65
(1984)(reporting criticisms of social welfare theory).
The mechanism that traditonally has been provided for the making whole of victims'
injuries is a civil action sounding in tort. Hudson, supra note 135, at 138. Considering
the general characteristics of offenders and victims and the costs of employing this pro-
cess, however, it is fair to describe the tort remedy as little more than an empty promise.
Id. at 135. In the first place, fewer than one out of five criminal offenses are closed by an
arrest. This results in a situation in which most victims have no identified offender to
sue. See, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS FOR 1983, supra note 44, at 451,
453. Even if an arrest is made and an offender identified, the substantial costs associated
with litigation, including the expense of retaining counsel, conducting discovery and
proceeding to trial, are sufficient to dissuade most victims from pursuing a tort suit.
Hudson, supra, at 139. Furthermore, a majority of crime victims are members of the
least economically advantaged sectors of society, and the characteristics which make it
difficult for victims to initiate litigation-poverty, advanced age and poor education-
also make it likely that most will be unaware of the remedies which do exist. Hudson,
supra, at 138; Lamborn, supra, at 41.
Equally important in rendering the tort remedy an inadequate solution is the fact
that offenders, like victims, tend to be poor and frequently are unemployed. Lamborn,
supra, at 38-39. Both of these characteristics are associated with judgment-proof civil
defendants. Id. at 38. In addition, whatever financial resources an offender may have
often are depleted in the course of defending both criminal and civil actions. Id. Leav-
ing aside the drain which may result if a fine is imposed as a criminal sanction, and the
technical issue of priority between the payment of criminal fines and the payment of civil
judgments, the financial condition of the offender is sure to be worsened further if he or
she is incarcerated before or after conviction. Id. Thus, while the typical criminal of-
fender is far from an "ideal civil defendant" initially, the fact that the victim must com-
pete with the criminal justice system over what are likely to be extremely limited
resources almost certainly insures that little or no civil recovery will occur.
284 Cf. Silving, supra note 262, at 145 (noting the possibility that punitive sanctions
described as non-punitive measures may be imposed upon offenders without the protec-
tions typically provided by the adjudicatory process).
285 See generally Brakel, Diversion from the Criminal Process: Informal Discretion, Motivation
and Formalization, 48 DEN. L.J. 211 (1971). See also Harland, supra note 1, at 68 (discuss-
ing pretrial restitution).
286 But see Rice, Mediation and Arbitration as a Civil Alternative to the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem-An Overview and Legal Analysis, 29 AM. U. L. REv. 17 (1979).
1022 RICHARD C. BOLDT [Vol. 77
nism for repairing the injuries suffered by those victims for whom
tort suits and public compensation are inadequate.
